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ABSTRACT
Since wireless networks share a communication medium, multiple transmis-
sions on the same channel cause interference to each other and degrade the
channel quality, much as multiple people talking at the same time make for
inefficient meetings. To avoid transmission collision, the network divides
the medium into multiple orthogonal channels (by interleaving the channel
access in frequency or time) and often uses medium access control (MAC)
to coordinate channel use. Alternatively (e.g., when the wireless users use
the same physical channel), the network users can emulate such orthogonal
channel access in processing by spreading and coding the signal. Building
on such orthogonal access technology, this dissertation studies protocols that
support the coexistence of wireless users and ensure wireless availability.
In contrast to other studies focusing on improving the overall efficiency
of the network, I aim to achieve reliability at all times. Thus, to study the
worst-case misbehavior, I pose the problem within a security framework and
introduce an adversary who compromised the network and has insider ac-
cess. In this dissertation, I propose three schemes for wireless availability:
SimpleMAC, Ignore-False-Reservation MAC (IFR-MAC), and Redundancy
Offset Narrow Spectrum (RONS). SimpleMAC and IFR-MAC build on MAC
protocols that utilize explicit channel coordination in control communication.
SimpleMAC counters MAC-aware adversary that uses the information being
exchanged at the MAC layer to perform a more power efficient jamming
attack. IFR-MAC nullifies the proactive attack of denial-of-service injec-
tion of false reservation control messages. Both SimpleMAC and IFR-MAC
quickly outperform the Nash equilibrium of disabling MAC and converge to
the capacity-optimal performance in worst-case failures. When the MAC
fails to coordinate channel use for orthogonal access or in a single-channel
setting (both cases of which, the attacker knows the exact frequency and time
location of the victim’s channel access), RONS introduces a physical-layer,
ii
processing-based technique for interference mitigation. RONS is a narrow
spectrum technology that bypasses the spreading cost and effectively coun-
ters the attacker’s information-theoretically optimal strategy of correlated
jamming.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Wireless systems offer an advantage in mobility and convenience (which are
becoming increasingly important in many modern-day applications) but have
a disadvantage that they inherently share a communication medium which
is less reliable than the devoted cable medium of wired communication sys-
tems. To achieve the better of both ends, researchers in communications
and computer networks have studied and designed schemes that will ensure
reliable communication while embracing the coexistence of communication
users within a shared medium.
Reliable transmission for wireless users depends on the availability of lower
layers of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. Since more-capable
wireless systems tend to use the same protocols as wired internet nodes at
the network layer and above, and since less-capable wireless systems have
substantial integration between application-level requirements and protocols
used above the network layer, the most significant gap in reliable protocols
for wireless systems lies at the physical and link layer. Therefore, I address
reliability and robustness at the two lower layers.
To model the worst-case impact of misbehavior and ensure reliability at all
times, I assume a malicious adversary. In contrast to previous work, I con-
sider attackers that are insiders, intelligent, and adversarial. In particular,
such adversaries are capable of reacting to legitimate user strategy (“intelli-
gent”), they have the keys of one or more legitimate nodes (“insider”), and
their goal is to minimize the throughput of legitimate users (“adversarial”).
The adversarial model represents a worst-case scenario for wireless availabil-
ity; a misbehaving user with equal capability that chooses any other strategy
cannot result in worse legitimate user performance.
I discuss medium access control protocols that utilize explicit channel co-
ordination in control communication in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 introduces
SimpleMAC, a protocol that counters MAC-aware attacks where attackers
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utilize MAC-layer information to have greater destructive impact on the net-
work. SimpleMAC is comprised of Simple Signaling Scheme (SSS) and Simple
Transmitter Strategy (STS). SimpleMAC counters two smart, power-efficient
jamming attacks: SSS mitigates MAC-aware jamming attack on control com-
munication (where the vulnerability comes from using a common, or known,
control channel), and STS prevents MAC-facilitated jamming attack on data
communication (where adversaries use the information being exchanged in
control communication to focus their jamming on data channels that are
being used). Then, in Chapter 4, the Ignore-False-Reservation MAC (IFR-
MAC) that nullifies the proactive attack of Denial-of-Service injection of
false reservation control messages is discussed. SimpleMAC and IFR-MAC,
together, provide a DoS-secure MAC protocol.
In contrast to SimpleMAC and IFR-MAC, I also consider the case where
MAC fails and the wireless system can not rely on orthogonal channel access
for availability. Chapter 5 provides a primer for wireless communication
and the physical-layer techniques used in practical settings, and Chapter 6
introduces RONS that is implemented at the physical layer and effectively
suppresses the attacker-optimal interference of correlated jamming.
2
CHAPTER 2
MEDIUM ACCESS CONTROL
BACKGROUND
2.1 Control-Based Medium Access Control
As wireless features are introduced into more and more electronic devices,
it is becoming increasingly important to use scarce radio spectrum as effi-
ciently as possible. An important part of efficient usage is effective coordi-
nation of user transmissions. Traditional protocols aim to avoid overlapping
transmissions; the typical channel access schemes separate users’ usage in
some combination of time, frequency, and code. As networks increasingly
carry data traffic, which is characterized by bursty arrivals, fixed channeliza-
tion is being replaced by dynamic Medium Access Control (MAC) protocols
that change user allocations from frame to frame. In a distributed MAC,
each node announces its usage intentions, both to link a transmitter-receiver
pair for communication and to help other transmitters minimize interference
(since other nodes avoid making conflicting transmissions minimizing inter-
ference both to the node that has announced its intentions and to a node
that cooperates by avoiding transmissions during the reserved slot). In this
dissertation, the explicit messages containing channel use information are re-
ferred to as reservations and the task of exchanging reservations as channel
coordination. In channel coordination, a network user reserves a channel by
sending one or more control packets (that contain its channel usage inten-
tions) on a control channel, and then uses the reserved data channel to send
its data traffic.
Modern day-to-day communication widely makes use of such reservation-
based MAC protocols to provide better performance. For example, IEEE
802.11 WLAN (also known as WiFi) virtual carrier sensing four-way hand-
shaking protocol has transmitter-receiver pair exchange Request to Send
(RTS) and Clear to Send (CTS) packets to reserve a channel; the broad-
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casted packets notify the pair’s pending use of the channel to the nearby
users that are within the transmission range. On the other hand, Bluetooth
and WiMax (based on IEEE 802.16 standard) have a centralized authority
scheduling the channel use to the network users.
2.2 MACs Are Built for Collaborative Nodes
Channel coordination is only useful when other nodes respect reservations;
such environments are called collaborative environments. In such environ-
ments, channel coordination protocols can provide substantial performance
gains. In particular, if I characterize the channel capacity using Shannon
capacity (as given by the Shannon-Hartley theorem), when two nodes with
equal power levels share a band, coordinating nodes get capacity
W
2
log2
(
1 +
S
N
)
whereas when they do not cooperate, they get capacity
W log2
(
1 +
S
S +N
)
since each node’s transmission is interference to the every other node. When-
ever the band’s signal-to-noise ratio exceeds about 2 dB, coordination pro-
vides substantial gains.
However, when users are selfish, the Nash equilibrium is to disable MAC
protocol and spread the transmission across the entire band [1,2]; such strat-
egy results in the tragedy of the commons where the self-centered behavior
over-exploits the shared network medium and the users end up performing
worse than had they cooperated and complied to the protocol, since there is
no reduction in collisions at the Nash equilibrium.
Even though a MAC is designed for collaborative environments I study the
network behavior when a portion of the network deviates from the protocol
(while the rest of the network is cooperative). A user might deviate for self-
ish reasons or a user’s hardware may fail, leading to unpredictable results.
This dissertation analyzed the protocol-deviance in the worst case, by con-
sidering the impact of an adversary whose sole goal is to minimize network
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performance. Current protocols, when faced with an intelligent, insider jam-
mer, will at best reach the Nash equilibrium, in which channel coordination
is completely disabled and each message is spread across the entire band.
That is, a misbehaving user can force the network’s optimal behavior to give
up the advantage of collaboration and disable MAC. Section 2.3 discusses
threats that can reduce the optimal network behavior to turn off MAC.
2.3 Threat Overview on MAC
A wide variety of MAC-layer protocols have been proposed for various en-
vironments and applications. This section presents an outline of security
vulnerabilities of existing wireless MAC protocols, where the attacker can
jam control messages and can use control messages to jam more effectively.
2.3.1 Threat Overview and Related Work
To reduce the inefficiencies inherent in simultaneous channel usage, most
wireless MAC-layer protocols (with few exceptions, such as ALOHA [3]) at-
tempt to reserve a channel by exchanging channel coordination information.
Traditionally, a common control channel is used to exchange channel coordi-
nation information among users. There are two important jamming attacks
against a control channel: first, the attacker can jam the channel itself, and
second, the attacker can use jamming-relevant information transmitted on
the control channel (such as when and where data transmissions will take
place) to facilitate effective jamming. In addition to jamming, an attacker
can conduct a proactive attack of injecting incorrect control messages to deny
availability to the network.
For denial-of-service (DoS) attack on wireless availability, previous litera-
ture describe attackers who can send excessive reservation messages to pre-
vent legitimate nodes from using the channel [4–7]. Another form of adver-
sarial behavior is channel jamming. Awerbuch et al. [8] propose a fair single-
channel MAC protocol against a power-limited jammer that does not jam all
of the time. Other papers propose mechanisms to avoid jamming [9–11] but
these approaches are not secure against insider attacks; that is, when jam-
mers are compromised network participants and thus have access to some of
5
the keys of the network nodes, jamming avoidance cannot be assured by this
prior work.
2.3.2 Vulnerabilities in Current Protocols
The use of a common control channel, which is typical in currently available
protocols, is vulnerable to jamming attacks. For example, in the IEEE 802.11
WiFi standard [12], nodes use virtual carrier sense in which they reserve the
channel by exchanging Request to Send (RTS) and Clear to Send (CTS)
messages; these messages can be jammed to reduce network performance.
Though virtual carrier sense provides an effective way for a legitimate poten-
tial transmitter to avoid collisions with another transmitter, the very mech-
anism that allows them to mitigate interference also allows an attacker to
jam every transmission. In particular, whenever an attacker senses another
user’s transmission, either through carrier sense or virtual carrier sense, the
attacker can jam the corresponding data packet.
In addition to carrier sense and virtual carrier sense, WiFi also uses a
Collision Avoidance mechanism in which a node transmitting a frame chooses
a backoff interval. The node counts down the backoff interval whenever the
channel is idle; this mechanism reduces the probability that two nodes will
transmit simultaneously. Several researchers have investigated the attack
wherein the attacker chooses incorrect backoff intervals [13–15].
In the Out-of-Band signaling scheme [16], each receiver sends a very nar-
rowband busy tone whenever it receives data to indicate the channel is in
use. A powerful adversary may be able to jam the busy tone, and even when
the jammer is unable to remove the busy tone, a jammer that hears a busy
tone knows that a receiver is active within its wireless transmission range.
A jammer that jams the data channel whenever it hears a busy tone can ef-
fectively deny service to receivers within its interference range. An attacker
can also falsely reserve the channel by continuously sending a busy tone.
IEEE 802.16 [17], commonly called WiMAX, uses a centralized scheduling
algorithm in which the base station assigns time slots to each user. Since the
base station broadcasts control messages, a jammer that knows the location of
the control channel can either jam the control channel to disrupt the exchange
of control messages or use the received channel scheduling information to jam
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data transmissions at the assigned time slots (and frequency channels). In
WiMAX, the control channel location is a published part of the standard,
but even if it were not, an attacker that has compromised a legitimate node
must know the location of the control channel. Furthermore, a node can
request and be scheduled for time and frequency slots that it does not need,
thus wasting time and bandwidth.
Another centralized protocol is Bluetooth [18], in which a master device
sends control messages to each slave device in the network (called a piconet).
An attacker who knows the frequency hopping pattern of a scheduled trans-
mission can easily jam that transmission. In Bluetooth, these frequency
hopping patterns are a public part of the standard, but even if it were not,
an attacker that has compromised a legitimate node must know the location
of the control channel. Furthermore, an attacker can become the master and
have significant control over other legitimate users.
MAC protocols that do not perform channel coordination suffer from higher
probability of collisions between simultaneous transmitters, resulting in more
interference. Thus, a protocol that lacks channel coordination functionality
yields lower SINR and therefore lower capacity.
In conclusion, currently implemented protocols either mitigate interference
from legitimate nodes by regulating their channel usage, in which case jam-
mers can effectively jam during legitimate node usage, or provide no channel
coordination and suffer from increased interference.
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CHAPTER 3
SimpleMAC
3.1 Chapter Overview
As discussed in Chapter 2, for efficient use of the shared network medium,
wireless systems often use a Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol to per-
form channel coordination by having each node announce its usage intentions
and other nodes avoid making conflicting transmissions. In a collaborative
environment, such MAC protocols yield performance gain. However, when an
attacking node can receive channel coordination information, such as when
the attacker is a compromised network node, coordination information can
also be used to jam more effectively, since jammers know exactly on which
channel to focus their jamming power to disrupt data communication. Also,
since the location of the control channel is pre-assigned and known to net-
work users, attackers can jam the control channel, thereby eliminating any
benefit legitimate users might gain from channel coordination.
MAC-layer Protocols, when faced with just one intelligent, insider jammer,
will at best reach the Nash equilibrium, in which channel coordination is
completely disabled and each message is spread across the entire band [1,2];
at the Nash equilibrium, there is no reduction in collisions, which reflects
a non-cooperative environment. In this chapter, I construct a theoretical
framework to analyze the dynamics between the adversaries and legitimate
users, then propose SimpleMAC, a MAC-layer protocol that performs chan-
nel coordination while mitigating the effects of jamming.
Section 3.3.1 describes the MAC-layer framework. A MAC protocol pro-
vides reduced probability of collision by exchanging a channel usage plan
with other network users; this channel usage plan is jamming-relevant infor-
mation because the plan allows legitimate users to avoid the transmitter but
also allows jammers to intentionally collide with the transmitter. I divide
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the scheme into two components. The transmitter strategy selects the set of
network nodes with which to share the relevant control message. This set,
which may vary for each packet, is called the recipient list and it is denoted
with S. The signaling scheme delivers a control message to each node in the
recipient list, and ensures that no other nodes are able to receive the control
message. When the adversary is malicious, the ideal recipient list includes
all legitimate users and no attackers.
SimpleMAC consists of the Simple Signaling Scheme (SSS) and the Simple
Transmitter Strategy (STS). I develop a jamming-resistant signaling scheme
to deliver jamming-relevant control message to exactly the set of nodes in
the recipient list S, and a transmitter strategy that decides on the recipi-
ent list based on prior receiver feedback. In the transmitter strategy, the
transmitter-receiver pair measures the performance of S after sending each
packet and uses this information to adapt S for future packet transmissions.
The long-term goal for the transmitter is to search for a set S that provides
the optimal performance. As a general rule, the choice of S = ∅ (equivalent
to disabling channel coordination) represents baseline performance; after a
sufficient number of independent trials, any set that performs significantly
worse must contain a jammer. Therefore, the transmitter can determine
whether channel coordination has been compromised by comparing the per-
formance of the recipient list with performance when S = ∅. However, since
attackers are intelligent, and thus capable of dynamically changing their jam-
ming strategy, a recipient list S with better performance than when S = ∅
does not necessarily mean that S excludes all attackers.
This thesis applies to both single-channel TDMA systems (with an energy-
limited attacker, since a power-limited attacker would jam at all times and
gain no advantage from channel coordination information) and multi-channel
systems (with a power-limited attacker). For clarity of presentation, I present
SimpleMAC as applied in multi-channel systems. Because I model legitimate
users as cooperative and attackers as malicious, SimpleMAC must simulta-
neously allow legitimate users to avoid the transmissions and yet prevent
attackers from coinciding with them. For this reason, each transmission
in the protocol transfer is sent using Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum
(FHSS), in which each transmission is sent while the transmitter hops from
one frequency band to another according to a pseudorandom hopping pat-
tern. Channel coordination information thus consists of the time at which a
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sender plans to send and the frequency hopping pattern the sender plans to
use.
SimpleMAC quickly outperforms the case where channel coordination is
disabled, eventually converges to the recipient list offering optimal perfor-
mance, and forces the optimal jammer strategy to be jamming at full power
all the time (even though jamming alerts the user and prompts it to stop
sharing information with the compromised recipient lists).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. After presenting the model
in Section 3.2 and setting up the theoretical framework in Section 3.3, I ana-
lyze the general jammer behavior in Section 3.4. I then introduce SimpleMAC
in Section 3.5, and the jammer reaction to the SimpleMAC scheme in Sec-
tion 3.6.1. Next, I mathematically analyze the performance of SimpleMAC
in Section 3.6.2 and evaluate it using MATLAB simulations and WARP im-
plementation in Section 3.7. Lastly, I present conclusions and open problems
in Section 3.9.
3.2 System Model and Assumptions
I consider an environment with T +1 non-idle transmitters (each transmitter
has T potential interference sources), each identified by an index i ∈ T =
{1, . . . , T + 1}, a subset N = {i1, . . . , iN} of which are N jammers. All non-
jammers are protocol-compliant. I assume a shared secret key between each
pair of nodes, and that all nodes operate in shared spectrum divided into C
channels, each with bandwidth W Hz. No online authority governs users. I
consider a repeated game with infinite horizon; either the transmission never
ends or the users do not know when the transmissions will end. I index the
rounds of the game r ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...}.
I assume that each user has technical means to transmit on the spectrum,
that the attacker ignores any legal prohibitions against interference, and that
there is no way to a priori determine which node is trustworthy. Also, be-
cause of the possibility of jamming, I make the standard assumption [19,20]
that each transmitter sends data using fast frequency hopping on randomly
generated hopping patterns chosen independently for each packet. Tradition-
ally, fast frequency hopping is characterized by a hopping time of more than
one hop per symbol; here, I only require that the hopping time be faster than
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the jammer’s reaction time.
At the physical layer, I assume there exists a known spreading gain at
which any pair of neighbors can communicate with a suitably low bit error
rate. Alternatively, I define a neighbor as a node that can be reached using
a specific spreading gain. In SimpleMAC, described in Section 3.5, I use
Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) for control communications and
Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) for data communications, and
I communicate the frequency hopping pattern in the control message.
The communication between any transmitter-receiver pair is single-hop;
that is, the transmitter does not rely on a third node to relay the message to
the final destination. For simplicity, each user is a neighbor of every other
user. Thus, when two nodes transmit on the same frequency at the same time,
those transmissions interfere with each other, resulting in reduced capacity.
SimpleMAC can be extended to hidden-terminal environments by having
both sender and receiver repeat each channel coordination transmission, al-
though the details of this approach are beyond the scope of this dissertation.
SimpleMAC is designed for unicast data transmissions, where performance
affects only the receiver. Therefore, when a sender transmits to multiple
receivers, the feedback of a malicious receiver does not affect the performance
of other receivers. However, a malicious receiver may be able to induce a
sender to choose S = ∅ for all transmissions to that receiver. The impact of
this selection depends on the transmission priority scheme, so this attack is
discussed further in Section 3.8.
All users, including attackers, share the same power constraint Pc. The
case where each attacker is more powerful than a normal user can be modeled
by increasing the fraction of nodes which are attackers.
3.2.1 Performance Metric
When user i transmits to user j, it does so on a frequency channel that
varies with time according to a frequency hopping pattern known to user i
and user j. At any point in time, the user transmits on frequency channel
c ∈ {1, . . . , C}. Assuming a flat fading channel with additive white Gaussian
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noise and Gaussian signals, the channel capacity of the link i→ j is:
R =
∫ fc+W/2
fc−W/2
log2 [1 + SINRi,j(f)] df (3.1)
where fc is user i’s carrier frequency, and SINR is the effective signal-to-
interference-and-noise ratio at the receiver
SINRi,j =
γi,jP˜i(f)
N˜0 +
∑
6`=i,`∈N c [γ`,jP˜`(f)] +
∑
k∈N [γk,jJ˜k(f)]
(3.2)
In Equation 3.2, γa,b is the channel gain between transmitter a and receiver b,
N˜0 is the power spectral density of the noise, N c are the indices of legitimate
users, N are the indices of jammers, P˜α is transmitter α’s power spectral
density for some α, and J˜k(f) is the jammer k’s power spectral density.
Shannon channel capacity (R) is an upper bound on communication rate
performance. Channel capacity is a mathematically simple formulation and
is tight in many practical environments; existing codes very nearly achieve
channel capacity [21]. In order to separate MAC-layer issues from physical-
layer decisions such as modulation and coding, I use both SINR and channel
capacity as representative performance metrics in the mathematical analysis.
I observe that Equation 3.1 exhibits two properties that I use in my analysis:
it is decreasing and convex with respect to jamming power and monotonically
increasing with respect to the user’s signal power. Though I use SINR and
capacity as representative measures of performance, my approach generalizes
to any utility function that is convex in interference power and monotonically
increasing in SINR. (In Section 3.7, the implementation testbed simulation
results show the effective SINR at the receiver, because achieving channel
capacity involves sophisticated coding and modulation, and because the in-
stantaneous capacity is strictly monotonic in the instantaneous SINR.)
Channel capacity R (Equation 3.1) serves as the utility function for the
legitimate transmitter i. The transmitter’s aim is to maximize its capacity
R. As R is a monotonically increasing function of Pi, the transmitter will
emit full power. To aggregate capacity (which is an instantaneous metric)
over time, I compute its time-average. At time t, given {Rt′ | t′ < t}, the
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utility function is:
U =
1
Nt
t∑
t′=t−Nt+1
E[Rt′ ] (3.3)
where Rγ is the capacity measured at time γ for some γ. In an infinite-
horizon game, Equation 3.3 is replaced by its limit as Nt → ∞, where Nt
represents the time duration of transmission.
3.2.2 Attacker Model
I consider a jammer that intends to minimize the utility function, Equa-
tion 3.3, subject to its power constraint:
minimize U subject to
∫
f
J˜k(f) df ≤ Pc, ∀k ∈ N (3.4)
I assume that jammers collude. Thus, if one jammer knows a user’s fre-
quency hopping pattern, then all jammers can make use of that information.
Also, attackers know the protocol and can adaptively change their strategies
according to the legitimate users’ strategies.
I also consider reactive jammers that jam according to their observations
on the target signal, in case they do not receive the user’s channel coordi-
nation information. To counteract reactive jammers, the user can shorten
the frequency hopping time so that the jammers do not have enough time to
observe the spectrum and jam the used channel. I do not consider the very
strong and sophisticated attack of correlated jamming, where an adversary
mimics the target signal with a phase offset of pi at equal amplitude, cancel-
ing the target signal (Chapter 6 considers such threat). Under this attack,
assuming the attacker has at least as much power as the legitimate node at
a target receiver, no physical layer can provide any throughput [22].
Attackers can choose between narrowband jamming (concentrating its power
on one or a subset of frequency channels at a time) or wideband jamming
(emitting power across the spectrum at a time) and can freely switch between
these strategies. Because the jammer has so much flexibility, I do not con-
sider legitimate user attempts to infer information about a jammer; however,
this approach still converges to the optimal performance.
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I also consider the possibility of non-Gaussian jamming, since Equation 3.1
holds only when all received signals are Gaussian signals. Given a Gaussian
fading channel with Gaussian signals, where the overall signal power is much
greater than the combined power of the jammer network, the optimal jammer
strategy is to jam with Gaussian noise [22, 23]. Also, the transmitter can
make any received jamming signal appear Gaussian by using a sufficiently
long Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) code shared only with the
receiver. When jammers do not know the code used by the transmitter,
the received jamming signal looks like a Gaussian signal by the central limit
theorem.
3.3 Theoretical Framework
3.3.1 Overview
I design SimpleMAC from the ground up without making any MAC-layer
assumptions. The MAC-layer framework contains two parts: a transmitter
strategy and a signaling scheme. For each packet, a transmitter strategy
determines the set of users S that will receive the channel coordination in-
formation for that packet; this set is called the recipient list. The optimal
transmitter strategy will prevent the attacker from gaining any advantage
from its knowledge of insider network keys while minimizing interference
from legitimate users. A signaling scheme delivers the control message to
the recipient list and provides availability (that is, messages are not easily
jammed) and confidentiality (that is, nodes not on the recipient list will not
receive the control message).
Figure 3.1 depicts the MAC-layer framework. When sending a packet,
the transmitter (1) chooses a subset S of network users, (2) transmits its
frequency hopping information to S, (3) transmits the data packet using the
previously reserved hopping pattern, and (4) determines the effectiveness of
S based on the feedback that it receives from the receiver.
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Figure 3.1: MAC protocol framework
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3.3.2 Collision between Benign Users
Even when the spectrum is used very sparsely, a randomly selected frequency
hopping pattern is likely to collide with the hopping patterns of other nodes.
Channel coordination schemes are designed to reduce this inter-transmitter
interference. When two nodes wish to use the same channel during the same
time slot, they each determine which of the transmitters has priority, for ex-
ample, based on the time at which each node claimed the channel. The node
that does not have priority will not transmit at all, so the corresponding re-
ceiver will decode random data in this position. However, since the positions
for these lost bits are known a priori, a sender mitigates the loss by using
channel coding and forward error or erasure correction.
Two nodes may collide when neither node informed the other about its fre-
quency hopping patterns, and, depending on the priority scheme, when only
one of the two nodes disclosed its transmission intentions to the other. In
the analysis, I assume that transmitter i has the highest priority for trans-
mission, and is targeted by all the jammers. In other words, all nodes in
the transmitter’s recipient list will avoid interfering with the transmitter (I
revisit this assumption in Section 3.8 and consider the case when all nodes
have equal priority). Thus, increasing the number of benign transmitters in
S reduces the number of potential interferers, increasing capacity.
3.3.3 Capacity Expression for the Framework
In this section, I mathematically derive the capacity of the system when all
channels have equal gains and all users emit power uniformly across their
chosen channel. Since legitimate users that receive the transmitter’s channel
coordination information will not interfere, the transmitter’s capacity de-
pends on its selection of recipient list S. Equation 3.1 can be simplified to:
R(S) = W · log2
[
1 + P
N0+
∑
6`=i,`∈(Nc∩Sc) P`+
∑
k∈N Jk(S)·Pc
]
where N0 is the noise power in the channel, P is the transmitter’s signal
power, P` is the amount of user `’s power that interferes with the transmitter’s
signal, Jk is the jammer k’s power normalized with respect to the power
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constraint Pc, and
Jk(S) ≤
{
1
C
, if (S ∩N ) = ∅
1, otherwise
In the (S∩N ) = ∅ case, the jammer does not receive the user’s channel coor-
dination information, and therefore can at best conduct wideband jamming
across C channels, as described in Section 3.4.
If I further assume that legitimate users not in S emit at full power to
maximize their own performance, then E[P`] =
Pc
C
,∀`, since there is a 1
C
chance that any legitimate user not in S will interfere with the transmitter.
Then, using Jensen’s inequality, the expected capacity is bounded from below
by:
E[R(S)] ≥ W · log2
[
1 + P
N0+|N c∩Sc|PcC +
∑
k∈N Jk(S)·Pc
]
(3.5)
I use this expression in the analysis.
3.3.4 Transmitter Strategy
To make future recipient list decisions, each network user records historical
performance data for each packet, including the recipient list used for that
packet and the resulting performance. One natural choice for the recipient
list is the set that has yielded the best average performance in the past. I call
this the Best so far set and denote it with SB: SB(t) = argmax
σ∈{S(t′),∀t′<t}
R¯(σ),
where R¯ is the time-average performance. When jammers jam at full power,
the optimal set is the set that includes all legitimate nodes and excludes all
jammer nodes; I denote this optimal set S∗. However, an attacker might
choose not to jam when certain nodes are in the recipient list, so S∗ may not
have the maximum performance for a particular jammer strategy; however,
the performance of S∗ is optimal in the worst case. The scheme will con-
verge to at least the performance of S∗, but if the attacker concedes better
performance, the scheme can take advantage of the better-performing set.
In order to improve the Best so far recipient list, a sender must explore
possible sets from time to time. To reach optimal performance, a transmitter
strategy must eventually explore the optimal set. When I do not know the
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jammer’s strategy or the distribution for the number of jammers, the optimal
set may be any set, because the attacker may choose to cease all jamming ac-
tivities when a particular recipient list is chosen. Thus, to provide optimality
against arbitrary attackers, a sender must be willing to explore all possible
sets. In the framework, as well as SimpleMAC, convergence to the optimal
set takes exponential time in the average case; however, I will show in Sec-
tion 3.7 that SimpleMAC improves over the state-of-the-art within a single
round in many cases, and fast convergence is not a goal of the SimpleMAC
design.
3.4 Jammer Strategy Analysis
In this section, I assume that the attacker is purely adversarial, as de-
scribed in Section 3.2.2. Attackers are capable of using a potentially non-
deterministic, time-varying strategy to meet their goal of minimizing capac-
ity. Since an attacker’s strategy depends on whether or not it receives the
channel coordination information, I study both cases.
3.4.1 Recipient List with No Jammer
If the recipient list S contains no jammers, then jammers do not learn any
jamming-relevant information, and thus do not know which channel will be
used for the user’s transmission. This limits jammers to a much weaker at-
tack, since they cannot use their compromised keys and gain no advantage
from collusion. The only decision to be made in this case is whether to choose
narrowband jamming or wideband jamming. I assume that a legitimate user
i will uniformly choose any of the C channels, and I observe that R is a
decreasing and convex function of J˜k(f). By Jensen’s inequality, the ex-
pected capacity E[R], under the constraint of Equation 3.4, is minimized by
choosing J˜k(f) =
Pc
C·W for each jammer k. Thus, to minimize capacity, jam-
mers will conduct wideband jamming when they do not know the frequency
hopping pattern, but conduct narrowband jamming when they do have the
information. In the analysis, I assume the jammer uses this strategy when it
does not know the frequency hopping pattern.
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3.4.2 Compromised Recipient List
I now analyze the jammer strategy when a jammer does receive the user’s
channel coordination information. In this scenario, jammers know where
to concentrate their power to minimize transmitter capacity. However, in
an infinite-horizon repeated game, jammers must also consider how their
current action will affect future capacity. Equation 3.1 shows that jamming
with higher power causes more interference and lowers capacity. However,
since a user will avoid any set S that appears to contain jammers, jammers
may not wish to strongly jam the transmission, hoping to reduce the user’s
suspicions that S contains a jammer. If the user converges on a new SB
that contains no jammers, then jammers can no longer influence capacity
except by wideband jamming. A jammer may then want the Best so far set
to include a jammer by abstaining from excessive jamming.
In the long run, the jammer knows that the transmitter will explore S∗,
and will choose the best set. If the jammer allows another set S ′ to have
better performance than S∗, then the transmitter will pick S ′, otherwise
it will pick S∗. If the jammer’s goal is to minimize capacity, they should
not concede any additional long-run performance to the sender. Thus the
sender will choose SB = S
∗, and the optimal jammer strategy will converge
to full-power jamming.
Claim 1. Given the general transmitter strategy in Section 3.3.4, jammer
strategy converges to full power over time:
∀k ∈ N , Jk(t)→ 1 as t→∞
Proof. Proof is by contradiction. Let J = 1
N
∑
k Jk and t
∗ be the time when
the legitimate user explores S∗. Suppose there exists an optimal jammer
strategy J(t) that does not converge to full-power over time: ∀ > 0,∃t >
, J(t) < 1, yet yields minimum capacity. Since the legitimate user occasion-
ally explores new recipient lists (as described in Section 3.3.4), it eventually
explores S∗ in finite time (t∗ < ∞). Once the transmitter explores S = S∗,
it will choose its Best so far recipient list SB, so that the capacity perfor-
mance is no worse than when S = S∗. Now let  = t∗ and compare J with
a jamming strategy J ′ that jams with full power after t∗. ∀t ≥ , J ′(t) = 1.
In every time interval, J ′ results in performance at least as bad as J , be-
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cause the recipient list in J is at least as good as S∗, and because the power
used by J ′ is at least as high as that used by J . Because J ′ causes greater
interference (power) at least once, J ′ results in lower performance than J .
Therefore J is not an optimal strategy, establishing by contradiction that an
optimal jammer strategy J must converge to full power over time.
3.5 SimpleMAC
SimpleMAC protocol has two components: the Simple Transmitter Strat-
egy (STS) and the Simple Signaling Scheme (SSS). Despite the simplicity
of the schemes, from which SimpleMAC derives its name, SimpleMAC effec-
tively combats intelligent attackers: it quickly outperforms the case where
MAC protocol is disabled (which is the standard approach for securing MAC
protocols) and has an easily analyzed optimal jammer strategy.
When selecting a recipient list, I determine the effectiveness of recipient
list S by comparing the capacity when S is chosen as the recipient list to
the capacity when no one knows the recipient list. In the latter case (i.e.,
when S = ∅), there is neither gain in capacity from legitimate nodes avoiding
the transmitter nor loss in capacity from the jammers using the jamming-
relevant information. Whenever the capacity is less than or equal to (with
some error margin) the capacity when S = ∅, the transmitter chooses a new
set S before the next transmission, because the current set S provides no
advantage over S = ∅.
SimpleMAC does not try to infer which nodes are jammers and which
ones are not; rather, it directly uses channel feedback to determine which
recipient lists result in good performance. For example, when node A shares
its information with a jammer (but does not cause interference itself), any
recipient list with node A in it will have decreased performance, so the STS
will avoid such list. Similarly, if node A jams only when node B is also in the
recipient list, the STS will avoid lists that contain both A and B. Because
SimpleMAC makes the recipient list decisions based on actual performance
and not behavior, SimpleMAC is immune to collusion.
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3.5.1 Simple Transmitter Strategy
In the STS, for each transmission t, a legitimate user has three options when
choosing a recipient list S:
1. Best so far (B): the set with best average performance among explored
sets, as described in Section 3.3.4.
2. Randomly explore (R): chosen uniformly at random among all possible
sets.
3. Empty set (E): S(t) = ∅.
The transmitter always chooses one of these three strategies. The Best
so far action, S(t) = SB corresponds to choosing the set that yielded the
highest average capacity among all the recipient lists that have been tried
through time t− 1, which guarantees performance at least as good as S = ∅,
since S = ∅ has been tried earlier. If jammers jam with sufficient power
(
∑
k∈N J >
T
C
), then the set S that yields the highest capacity is S∗, the set
that contains all the legitimate users and excludes all the attackers. In this
case, when the user explores sets occasionally (so that the user eventually
visits all possible sets with probability one), the Best so far set SB converges
to S∗, since the probability that S∗ has been previously chosen approaches
one. The user chooses the Randomly explore action to search for a set that
yields higher capacity than the previous Best so far set. Once such a set
is found, the set SR becomes the new Best so far until the node discovers
another set that yields even higher capacity. The more often the user chooses
to explore a random set, the more quickly SB converges to S
∗. The Empty
set action establishes baseline performance during each time interval, so that
slow time-variance in channel conditions do not bias set selection.
The STS operates in rounds. For each transmission t within round r, the
user makes an independent random choice among the three options. The
probabilities may vary with r, so that in expectation, round r contains B(r)
transmissions with the Best so far recipient list, R(r) transmissions on a ran-
domly chosen recipient list, and E(r) transmissions using an empty recipient
list. Round r lasts for B(r) + R(r) + E(r) transmissions, and I do not rely
on the secrecy of B(r), E(r), R(r).
In order to converge to the optimal performance, I explore a user strategy
where the user uses the Best so far set more and more often, while occa-
sionally using Randomly explore and Empty set. One such user strategy
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is:
B(r) = rδ, R(r) = 1, E(r) = 1,∀r (3.6)
In order to converge to the optimal performance for S∗, δ needs to be positive.
A higher δ corresponds to more aggressive search for a better Best so far set
and thus quicker convergence to S∗.
3.5.2 Modified and Hybrid Simple Transmitter Strategy
STS uses a uniform distribution for choosing a recipient list to explore new
sets. Although the protocol quickly finds a recipient list that only contain
legitimate users and thus outperforms S = ∅ (it takes 2N rounds in expec-
tation), it takes a long time to search for the optimal set S∗ for large T (it
takes 2T rounds in expectation).
To improve the convergence rate to the optimal performance of using S =
S∗, I develop the Modified Simple Transmitter Strategy (MSTS). MSTS is a
modified version of STS where I use a deterministic exploration of recipient
lists, as opposed to a random strategy for exploring. In particular, I use
a brute-force approach searching large sets before smaller sets. Given the
number of users T , it first tries S = T (i.e., broadcast to all entities in
the network), then explores all possible sets that have T − 1 users, and
then move on to sets that have T − 2 users, and so on. Compared to STS,
MSTS is guaranteed to find S∗ in
∑N
i=0
(
T
i
)
= O(TN) rounds and quickly
converges to the optimal performance for large T . However, MSTS does not
find a jammer-free recipient list for the first
∑N−1
i=0
(
T
i
)
rounds, during which
period, it has no gain from channel coordination. Therefore, STS and MSTS
have a tradeoff between the rate of convergence to S = S∗ and convergence
to improvement over S = ∅. Finally, I define Hybrid Simple Transmitter
Strategy (HSTS), which interleaves the exploration approaches of the STS
and the MSTS. In particular, in each exploration stage, I alternate between
the random exploration strategy of STS and the deterministic strategy of
MSTS.
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3.5.3 Simple Signaling Scheme
In order to send a control message to exactly those nodes in a recipient list,
SimpleMAC needs a signaling scheme that provides confidentiality against
malicious entities and reliability in the presence of jamming. I make no
attempt to design an efficient signaling scheme; because the overhead of a
control message is amortized over the data frame, and because the wireless
user can choose arbitrarily long data frames, the system can reach near-
optimal overall protocol performance even with an extremely inefficient sig-
naling scheme. Thus, SSS simply unicasts the control messages to each recip-
ient in the recipient list. SSS provides confidentiality by encrypting messages
with a symmetric key, and availability by using direct sequence spread spec-
trum (DSSS) using a chip sequence known only to the sender and receiver.
In a 50-node network with 20-byte reservation messages (consisting of source
address, destination address, and a seed for the hopping pattern), if each
reservation covers 100 kB of data (for example, 66 packets each 1500-bytes
long), SSS incurs an overhead of not more than 1%, and average overhead
of 0.5%. Though the data rate may be higher than the control rate due
to the use of DSSS for the control message, SSS can continue to keep the
overhead low by covering more data with each control message, or by replac-
ing repeated-unicast with a jamming-resilient broadcast protocol, of which
several have been proposed [24–26]. SSS simply requires that each node has
a pairwise shared key with every other node. Such keys can be established
through Diffie-Hellman exchanges over a jamming-resilient broadcast proto-
col.
3.6 SimpleMAC Theoretical Analysis
3.6.1 Jammer Reaction to SimpleMAC
In Section 3.4, I studied the attacker strategy under the general framework
and showed that the optimal attacker strategy converges to full power, even
though an attacker may wish to avoid detection so that the legitimate user
will use a compromised recipient list. In this section, I claim that against
the STS, optimal jammers jam at full power all the time. The claim holds
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because, unlike the user’s selection of recipient lists, the user’s choice of
action (Best so far, Randomly explore, or Empty set) does not adapt to
jammer strategy. Intuitively, the sender forms a partial order on recipient
lists based on their past performance. An attacker that does not jam at full
power can jam at a higher power level and yet maintain the same partial
order of recipient lists (or a functional equivalent), which shows that any
strategy that does not jam at full power cannot be optimal.
Claim 2. Against the STS, the best jammer strategy is to emit at full power
all the time, i.e.,
∀t,∀k ∈ N , Jk(S) =
{
1
C
, if (S ∩N ) = ∅
1, else
Proof. Proof is by contradiction. Suppose that an optimal jammer strategy
J = (J1, J2, ..., JN) does not jam at full power at some time; I let Γ be the
set of times at which J does not use full power. I now show that there
exists a different jammer strategy J ′ that yields less capacity than J while
preserving the legitimate user strategy. To find such J ′, I assume perfect
knowledge about the recipient list S. (This does not mean that a jammer
needs perfect information; rather, it shows that even a jammer with perfect
information will still choose the simple strategy of full-power jamming, and
therefore any attacker should do the same.) J ′ will only diverge from J when
J does not emit at full power,
At time t′ ∈ Γ, let the two best previously measured recipient lists be A
and C, where A is the best and C is the second-best. Then either S = A
yields higher capacity than S = C or both sets S = A and S = C yield the
same performance. I study the two cases separately:
(i) If R(A) > R(C), then pick J ′(t′) such that RJ ′(A) = RJ (A)+RJ (C)2 .
This choice preserves the performance order of recipient lists and thus does
not change the user’s choice of recipient list.
(ii) If R(A) = R(C), then pick J ′(t′) such that its corresponding perfor-
mance is  smaller than that of J(t′) for small . This breaks the tie between
A and C since A 6= C. Though this changes the legitimate user’s choice of
recipient list (because the legitimate user will choose A over C for the Best
so far set), the legitimate user strategy when jammer picks J ′ is function-
ally equivalent to the legitimate user strategy when jammer picks J (because
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when the jammer picks J , it does not matter whether the user chooses A or
C). Therefore, J ′ yields smaller capacity than J .
Since, in both cases J ′ yields lower capacity than J while preserving the
order of recipient lists (and thus preserving the legitimate user strategy or
its equivalent), J is not optimal and there is a contradiction.
3.6.2 Performance Analysis
Under the STS, a legitimate user chooses the recipient list from among three
options: Best so far (B), Randomly explore (R), and Empty set (E). I use
Equation 3.1 to determine the expected capacity. Since attackers in S jam
at full power, as shown in Section 3.6.1, S = S∗ (including no jammers
but all other legitimate users) yields the optimal performance. Thus, the
expected capacity varies with time (in units of rounds r) until it reaches the
steady state where SB = S
∗. The steady-state expected capacity is shown in
Equation 3.9, where α denotes the number of legitimate users outside S (who
could potentially cause interference to the transmitter) and
(
a
b
)
= a!
b!(b−a)! .
For the transient expected capacity, E[R|Random] and E[R|Empty] are
constant in time, whereas the expected capacity for Best so far varies with
time. The user chooses SB = ∅ at round r if all the previously explored sets
contain jammers; otherwise, he chooses the set that contains no jammer and
the most nodes (minimizing α). The term E[R(r)|Best] for the rth round is
expressed in Equation 3.10 where β corresponds to the number of times that
the user found a jammer-free set, and Bi are independent binomial random
variables with probability 0.5 (p = 0.5) and T −N trials (n = T −N), since
T −N is the number of protocol-compliant users.
3.7 SimpleMAC Evaluation
In earlier sections, I have analyzed SimpleMAC theoretically, in a manner
that is general and not limited to any particular system design. In this
section, I evaluate SimpleMAC in practice both using MATLAB simulations
and a testbed implementation on the WARP software radio platform [27].
As described in Section 3.2.1, I use SINR as the metric in this section both
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E[R]ss = lim
r→∞E[R(r)]
= Pr[Best] · E[R|Best]
+Pr[Random] · E[R|Random]
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(3.9)
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E[R(r)|Best] = Pr[∀r′ < r, SR(r′) ∩N 6= ∅] · E[R]S=∅ + Pr[∃r′ < r, SR(r′) ∩N = ∅]
·
T−N∑
α=0
Pr[|S| = T −N − α] · E[R]|S|=T−N−α
= (1− 2−N )r ·W · log2
(
1 +
P
N0 +
T
C
P
)
+
r∑
β=1
(r
β
)
(1− 2−N )r−β(2−N )β
·
[
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α=0
Pr[ min
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Bi = α] ·W · log2
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P
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N+α
C
P
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C
P
)]}
(3.10)
because capacity is strictly monotone in SINR and because I can evaluate
SINR improvements without needing to make perfect modulation and coding
choices that are necessary to achieve channel capacity.
3.7.1 Methodology and Metric
I built SimpleMAC implementation on the WARP (Wireless Open-Access
Research) software-defined radio platform. I used four WARP boards: one
acting as the source, one acting as the receiver, and the other two acting as
co-existing transmitters. By using the MIMO capabilities of the boards, I
built an environment consisting of one source, one receiver, and four other
transmitters (T = 4), one of which is a jammer (N = 1). I divided the
spectrum into five channels of equal bandwidth1 (C = 5). Also, I manually
calibrated the antenna locations so that the receiver observes approximately
the same power from each transmitter.
For the purposes of the evaluation, I filled the queues at each node so that
each transmitter transmits packets all the time. This is not a requirement
of SimpleMAC; because the recipient list performance estimates will not be
updated during periods without traffic, traffic is always present from the
1The evaluations focus on scenarios with relatively few channels; this is not a limitation
of SimpleMAC, but is a performance optimization. SimpleMAC can improve performance
regardless of the number of channels, but the optimal number of channels tends to be small
relative to the number of transmitters, because from a capacity perspective, it is much
better to have a legitimate-to-legitimate node collision than to let spectrum go unused.
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perspective of the protocol. In fact, SimpleMAC works even in dynamic
environments where the jammer and competing transmitters are sometimes
present and sometimes absent; in Section 3.7.6, I show that SimpleMAC
works even better in mobile environments.
At the physical layer, the system modulates data using differential quadra-
ture phase-shift keying (DQPSK), and synchronize using a preamble which is
a Barker sequence modulated using binary phase-shift keying (BPSK). The
entire 12 MHz-wide spectrum is divided (centered at 2.452 GHz) into 300
OFDM subcarriers, so each channel contains 60 subcarriers. I send the con-
trol communication across the entire band (300 subcarriers). The frequency
hopping scheme is to split each data message into frames of 60 symbols,
which I simultaneously send on each of 60 subcarriers in the chosen channel.
The user hops from channel to channel between frames.
The source transmitter sends random symbols to the receiver, and I observe
the decoded symbols at the receiver. I compare these symbols to determine
the error rate, and use that error rate to estimate the signal-to-interference-
and-noise ratio (SINR) at the receiver. The expected bit error rate (BER)
and the expected SINR at the receiver (SINR) have the following relationship
for DQPSK modulation [28,29]: BER = 1
2
(
1−
√
2·SINR√
1+4·SINR+2·SINR
2
)
.
I also validated the results using a MATLAB-based simulation. The simu-
lator works on a per-packet basis: for each time slot, each transmitter chooses
a recipient list according to the STS, and the channel selection according to a
uniform random distribution. The channel model is an independent, identi-
cally distributed Rayleigh fading channel with AWGN noise. I then compute
the number of interfering users (legitimate and jammer) and calculate the
resultant SINR, which I then use as feedback for the next round.
To analyze the performance of STS in the implementation and simula-
tion environments, I use the S = ∅ performance (corresponding to the no
channel coordination) as the reference and study the performance gain over
S = ∅. This gain represents the improvement over a protocol that does
not reserve a channel prior to data communication. I study the SINR gain
which is the SINR observed by the STS divided by the SINR when S = ∅.
As shown in Equation 3.1, the instantaneous channel capacity (which I use
in the theoretical analysis) is strictly monotone in instantaneous SINR, and
assuming the optimal fixed strategy for jammers, this relationship extends
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to the time-average SINR and the time-average capacity in Equation 3.3.
3.7.2 Without Attack
I first consider the performance of the protocol when all transmitters are
protocol-compliant. In this scenario, the protocol minimizes unintentional
interference, and the more nodes the recipient list includes, the better the
performance. Figure 3.2(a) shows the estimated SINR and reflects a 14.1 dB
SINR increase between |S| = 0 (no coordination) and |S| = 3 (full coordina-
tion). The performance under full coordination gives us an estimate of the
SNR without interference (when one channel is used): SNR ≈ 20dB = 100.
3.7.3 Under Attack
I now consider protocol performance under jamming. If the recipient list is
compromised and contains the jammer, the jammer can effectively jam the
transmitter by following its hopping pattern. Otherwise, the jammer can
either choose to jam across all five channels at reduced power per channel,
or on a random channel at full power. Figure 3.2(a) displays the expected
SINR at the receiver in each of the three cases. Including more legitimate
users in the recipient list yields better SINR, as described in Section 3.7.2. I
also observe a drastic drop in performance when S is compromised; whenever
a set contains a jammer, its SINR is below 0 dB, since the jamming power
is equal to the signal power, and other legitimate nodes may accidentally
interfere. (When there is perfect coordination among legitimate nodes, the
only additional noise is the receiver’s thermal noise, so the SINR is very
close to 0 dB in this case.) These cases with compromised recipient lists thus
all perform worse than when disabling channel coordination (S = ∅), which
provides 3.72 dB SINR. Furthermore, wideband jamming is more effective
and yields lower SINR for the target transmitter than narrowband jamming,
verifying the theoretical analysis in Section 3.4.1.
Despite the risk of possibly choosing the jammer, channel coordination is
still potentially advantageous. Choosing a random recipient list S = SR has
expected performance better than S = ∅ in expectation (computation shows
an SINR gain of about 1 dB assuming wideband jamming for uncompromised
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Figure 3.2: SimpleMAC STS performance
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S). Furthermore, once the STS converges to the best possible set, I can reach
an SINR of about 9.69 dB in spite of the wideband jamming, which reflects
an SINR gain of 5.97 dB over the baseline performance of S = ∅.
3.7.4 Data Communication Using the STS
Now that I have established the performance of known-good and known-
bad sets, I study the performance of the STS and explore its convergence
behavior. For each round, the STS performs three actions (B, R, E) as
described in Section 3.5. In the evaluation, the jammer uses the optimal
strategy (full-power jamming using all available information).
Because the metric is SINR gain, and the baseline performance is the
empty set, the Empty set has performance of 0 dB. The Randomly explore
action chooses a recipient list at random with uniform probability. There-
fore, the performance of Randomly explore is independent and has constant
expectation across time. Assuming that the user randomly explores at least
once per round, the Best so far performance is increasing in time, and con-
verges to the optimal steady-state performance where S = S∗, as more sets
are explored and the user has more sets from which to choose SB.
In Figure 3.2(b), I plot the performance of the Best so far strategy un-
der three evaluation environments: the theoretical analysis corresponding
to Equation 3.10, the simulation, and the testbed implementation. For
the implementation results, I also plot 95% confidence intervals, which are
not shown for the simulation results because the simulation results included
enough runs that the confidence intervals would not be visible. The results
show that the performance predicted by the theoretical analysis coincides
with the simulations. The implementation performance is worse than the
theoretical and simulation results because the simulation assumes a perfect
measurement of SNR, whereas the implementation infers it from the bit er-
ror rate; early in the run, when the number of observed bits is small, the
BER measurement can deviate from the expected BER, and the STS may
as a result make suboptimal choices. However, in later rounds, this perfor-
mance difference decreases as the implementation gains better information.
As a result, the maximum performance difference of 23% (of implementa-
tion performance) occurs at round one and decreases to 16% at round 20
31
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
Signal-to-Interference Ratio (dB)
B
it
 E
rr
o
r 
R
a
te
 
 
No spreading
Implementation (x4)
Theoretical (x4)
Implementation (x16)
Theoretical (x16)
Figure 3.3: SimpleMAC SSS performance
in Figure 3.2(b). I also show the overall (as opposed to Best so far only)
performance of STS under the implementation for δ = 0.5. The perfor-
mance of STS overall (including Empty and Random transmission sets) is
monotonically increasing in time and begins outperforming the no-channel-
coordination option after round one. I will later show that the STS converges
to the Best so far performance in Section 3.7.6.
3.7.5 Control Communication Using the SSS
SimpleMAC relies on a robust signaling scheme that can reach each recipient
on the recipient list. I implemented Simple Signaling Scheme in WARP using
wideband communication and Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS), as
described in Section 3.5.3; the decoder is based on an analog correlator.
In order to study the effect of spreading gain, I sent messages using three
different code lengths: 1 (no spreading and thus, no redundancy), 4, and
16. I sent each chip on a separate, adjacent OFDM subcarrier. To get
various signal-to-interference ratios, I fixed the signal power and varied the
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interference power to obtain signal-to-interference ratios ranging from -15 dB
to 15 dB. Figure 3.3 shows the relationship between the BER performance
and the signal-to-interference ratio.
To show the effectiveness of spreading to avoid interference in SSS, I gener-
ated theoretical curves by shifting the “no spreading” result by the expected
spreading gain. As expected, the implementation result aligned well with the
theoretical. When the code length is small, the performance can be slightly
better than the theoretical because the x-axis considers only interference but
not noise; the processing gain filters both interference and noise, which means
that the implementation slightly outperforms the shifted curve. For exam-
ple, when the code length is 4, the implementation has better performance
than the theoretical except between -5 and -1 dB. However, with increasing
code length, I use an increasing number of adjacent subcarriers, increasing
inter-carrier interference and degrading performance.
3.7.6 Simulations with Mobility
I have previously shown that without mobility, STS is effective. Using the
simulator, I now show that introducing mobility makes STS more effective;
that is, transmitter performance increases when it is surrounded with mobile
users. In the mobile environment, at the beginning of each round, each
mobile user is placed at a random position, and I compute the channel gains
based on the positions and a path loss model (with path loss exponent 3)
and Rayleigh fading. I fix the receiver’s location and choose the position of
each mobile user with a distribution such that the expected received power
corresponds to unit channel gain; that is, the expected received power is the
same in the mobile and static cases. I use the same parameter values as I
did previously: C = 5, T = 4 (other than the source transmitter), N = 1,
SNR (across the entire spectrum) = 13 dB. To allow for comparison between
scenarios, I normalize all performance to the SINR achieved using a S = ∅
in the static case. I also ran for an increased number of rounds (104). I plot
performance on a semi-log scale to better show the dynamics of convergence.
In each case, I consider convergence to improvement, which shows how
quickly the performance exceeds the no-channel-coordination case, i.e., S =
∅, and approximate convergence, which shows when the system reaches within
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10% of steady-state performance.
For comparison, the static case, where no user moves, is shown in Fig-
ure 3.4(a) (and reflects the data shown in Figure 3.2(b)). The scheme con-
verges to improvement instantly at round one, since the expected SINR for
Random set exceeds one (as I discussed in Section 3.7.3), and achieves ap-
proximate convergence in about 32 rounds and 316 rounds, respectively, for
δ = 1 and δ = 0.5, for an eventual performance gain of 5.31 dB or 3.4.
I expect that mobility will improve performance for any set S because of
Jensen’s inequality. Using Equation 3.2, I observe that SINR is convex in
channel gain γ of other users, so static channel gains are worse than random
channel gains when the expected channel gain is equal. Adding mobility thus
improves both SINR for any set S, including S = ∅. As more nodes become
mobile (0 in Figure 3.4(a), 1 in Figure 3.4(c), 4 in Figure 3.4(b), and 5 in
Figure 3.4(d)), the Empty set SINR performance monotonically increases.
The values for SINREmpty are shown in Figure 3.4.
To show the source of the additional SINR gain, I performed two addi-
tional set of experiments, one in which only legitimate users were mobile
(Figure 3.4(b)) and one in which only jammers were mobile (Figure 3.4(c)).
Adding mobility for legitimate users, as shown in Figure 3.4(b), has minimal
impact on the steady-state performance SINRBest, because they avoid col-
lision and create no interference in steady-state where SB = S
∗. However,
when legitimate users move, convergence is much faster. In particular, ap-
proximate convergence occurs around 16 rounds and 188 rounds, compared
to the static case of 32 rounds and 316 rounds, for δ = 1 and δ = 0.5, re-
spectively. This increased convergence speed is because the jammers’ noise
contribution is more consistent and therefore has a larger impact on perfor-
mance, making jammers more easily identifiable.
On the other hand, jammer mobility, as shown in Figure 3.4(c), results in
a substantial improvement of SINRBest. When S = ∅, the majority of noise
comes from legitimate nodes, so jammer has limited impact. However, after
many rounds, SB approaches S
∗, so jammers’ interference comprises most of
the noise, so SINRBest improves more than SINREmpty.
When all nodes other than the source transmitter are mobile (Figure 3.4(d)),
I get benefits from both user mobility and jammer mobility. leading to faster
convergence and better SINR performance for all STS action choices of B,R,E
as compared to the stationary scenario. The steady-state SINRBest values
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Figure 3.4: SimpleMAC simulations with mobility (gain is relative to
static-case S = ∅ performance)
show the mobile case having 7 dB improvement, or about five times as much
improvement as, compared the static case, which yields 95% capacity im-
provement over the static case. Thus SimpleMAC performs even better in
mobile environments than in stationary ones.
3.7.7 MSTS and HSTS
As the network size grows, STS performance converges more slowly. In spe-
cific, convergence to improvement over S = ∅ and convergence to the optimal
performance of S = S∗ occur in 2N and 2T rounds, respectively, in expec-
tation. In this section, I study the convergence dynamics and demonstrate
the effectiveness of Modified Simple Transmitter Strategy (MSTS) and Hy-
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Figure 3.5: SimpleMAC STS and MSTS comparison
brid Simple Transmitter Strategy (HSTS), discussed in Section 3.5.2. To
demonstrate that the schemes work for larger networks, the simulator uses
the parameter set of C = 120, T = 40, N = 3 and is deployed in a static
environment without mobility. Figure 3.5 compares the convergence of STS,
MSTS, and HSTS and plots the expected SINR gain of the best so far recip-
ient list. MSTS achieves steady-state performance much quicker than STS
(S∗ is guaranteed to be found in
∑3
i=0
(
40
i
)
= 10, 701 rounds) but achieves
slower rate for convergence to improvement (the transmitter does not find a
jammer-free recipient list before round 821 =
∑2
i=0
(
40
i
)
). HSTS interleaves
the exploration approaches of STS and MSTS in each round and simulta-
neously provides fast convergence to S = S∗ (within 2 · 10, 701 = 21, 402
rounds) and fast convergence to improvement (one round in expectation).
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3.8 Alternative Transmission Priorities
In Section 3.3.2, I considered a single user that has the highest priority for
transmission on the channel, so all other legitimate users will avoid that
node’s transmissions, and I calculate the performance improvement of that
node. In this section, I consider nodes that have equal priority. At the
steady-state where SB = S
∗ for all legitimate users, and where all users have
equal priority, each user will defer a 1− σ fraction of its slots, where
σ =
T−N∑
k=0
Prk · 1
k + 1
where Prk is the probability that k other users are transmitting on the same
channel and has a binomial distribution with parameters of T − N trials
and 1
C
probability. To evaluate SimpleMAC’s performance in this egalitarian
regime, I multiply the previous performance measurements by a fraction
of σ. Since the simulations with mobility showed a capacity gain of 112%
for a single priority node (Section 4.6), the capacity gain is 56% when all
nodes have equal priority. Similarly, without mobility, the capacity gain over
baseline strategy is 51% with equal priority among all nodes.
Transmission priorities also affect how a node performs with a malicious
receiver. If a malicious receiver forces a legitimate transmitter A to send with
S = ∅, then the probability that any other node collides with transmitter A
increases. In the worst case scenario, if transmitter A has absolute priority
and is always transmitting, then A operates as a narrowband jammer. How-
ever, I can also consider the class of transmission priority schemes in which
reserved channels always take priority over unreserved channels; under such
schemes, in the steady-state, transmitter A will always defer to transmissions
of other nodes, actually increasing the performance of other nodes. A more
complete analysis of transmission priority schemes and malicious receivers is
beyond the scope of this dissertation.
3.9 Chapter Summary
SimpleMAC is a MAC protocol that provides effective channel coordination
to minimize interference among coexisting transmitters while simultaneously
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resisting jammers that use channel coordination information to jam more
effectively. SimpleMAC avoids control channel jamming and limits jamming-
relevant information to a recipient list, adjusting the recipient list to optimize
performance. SimpleMAC converges to the optimal performance and forces
an optimal jammer to always jam at full power. I used a game-theoretical
approach to counter intelligent attackers, and analyzed the effectiveness of
the SimpleMAC scheme through theory, simulation, and implementation,
and observed over 570% increases in SINR and over 50% increases in channel
capacity gains in a realistic mobile environment.
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CHAPTER 4
IGNORE-FALSE-RESERVATION MAC
4.1 Chapter Overview
In wireless networks, many MAC protocols allow a node to make a channel
reservation to reduce the probability that its transmission will collide with
another user’s transmission. An adversary can launch a two-pronged Denial-
of-Service attack against such MAC protocols: first, it can send excessive
reservation requests (to consume network resources with minimal attacker
resources), and second, it can jam those channels that it has not reserved.
Since normal users do not attempt to transmit on channels reserved by others,
the attacker can attack with greater power efficiency, reducing the number
of channels it needs to jam by using reservations to cover a subset of the
channels.
The false reservation attack reserves channel bandwidth without the in-
tention of using it and is a power-efficient way to deny service to legitimate
nodes. To best understand the effect of the false reservation attack, I con-
sider a multi-channel environment with power-limited attackers (however,
the work can also be applied to single-channel time division multiple access
(TDMA) systems with energy-limited attackers). In a multi-channel envi-
ronment, the frequency spectrum is divided into multiple channels and each
user competes for bandwidth on one channel at a time; the framework con-
siders channels that have flexible bandwidth and varying center frequency.
It is a standard assumption that the attacker is power-limited because an at-
tacker without power limits can jam from DC to light at unlimited power, in
which case the normal user can receive no throughput. A false reservation is
a strong attack in the multi-channel power-limited environment because the
reservation message takes much less power than actually using the channel,
and the multi-channel environment is appropriate because a power-limited
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attacker could fully occupy a single channel even without the need to resort
to the false reservation attack.
To counter the false reservation attack, I develop a spectrum channel allo-
cation mechanism that assigns bandwidth to each network user to maximize
overall performance in the presence of malicious entities. Because an at-
tacker that uses its reserved bandwidth is indistinguishable from a normal
user, I focus on attackers that request bandwidth without using it for trans-
mission. This attack takes relatively little attacker effort (to transmit control
messages) and takes resources out of the network disproportionately to at-
tacker effort. I consider jamming legitimate transmissions as the attacker’s
best alternative attack; however, effective jamming demands greater attacker
power and is thus less efficient than false reservation. Successful false reser-
vation also allows attackers to focus their power on jamming the remaining,
unreserved channels, causing greater degradation in channel quality for legit-
imate users than wideband jamming without false reservation. Ignore-False-
Reservation MAC (IFR-MAC) is a channel allocation scheme that allocates
bandwidth according to demonstrated resources, rather than according to
identity; it allocates bandwidth to each user based on the power received
from that user, and thus forcing attackers to consume power on the reserved
channel to effectively make future reservation requests. In other words, I
aim to drive the attacker’s behavior to converge to that of a normal user
(who uses the data channel that it has reserved) or a pure wideband jammer
(which cannot be stopped) - but not both. In contrast, an identity-based
channel reservation scheme assigns all network users equal bandwidth and
is vulnerable to false reservation attack, which I consider to be the baseline
strategy for IFR-MAC performance comparison.
In order to use the observed power information to effectively coordinate
channel access, I design a protocol in which all users agree on and distribute
the bandwidth assignment. IFR-MAC provides a centralized channel coordi-
nation scheme where there is an online trusted authority, such as the access
point in WiFi, who coordinates the users’ spectrum use by broadcasting
each node’s bandwidth assignment. I then devise Distributed Ignore-False-
Reservation MAC (DIFR-MAC), in which the receivers reach consensus on
bandwidth allocation in a distributed manner. Since it is hard to individually
detect attackers and exclude attackers from contributing to the coordination
process, DIFR-MAC introduces another vulnerability in which attackers can
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share false information for coordination. With IFR-MAC and DIFR-MAC,
when attackers comprise a minority of the network, the optimal DoS attack-
ers’ strategy usually becomes physical-layer jamming, as opposed to the more
efficient false reservation attack. IFR-MAC and DIFR-MAC counter the false
reservation attack while simultaneously improving spectral efficiency, maxi-
mizing the aggregate rate of the network.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. I establish the setup of
the investigation in Section 4.2. In Section 4.2.2, I present the threat model
and assumptions about attackers. I introduce the secure channel reserva-
tion scheme, IFR-MAC in Section 4.3 and its distributed counterpart in Sec-
tion 4.4 and theoretically analyze the performance and the attacker’s optimal
strategy in Section 4.5. Afterward, I evaluate IFR-MAC with implementa-
tion testbed experiments in Section 4.6 and with simulations in Section 4.7
and conclude the chapter in Section 4.8.
4.2 System Model and Assumptions
I consider a scenario in which there are T non-idle transmitters, which com-
pose the set T (each user is indexed with i where i ∈ T = {1, 2, . . . , T}),
that share a frequency band with a total bandwidth W . In T , there are M
malicious attackers, each identified by an index k ∈M = {1, 2, . . . ,M}, and
the rest of them are protocol-compliant. All users operate on open spectrum
and communicate directly, i.e., no communication relies on a third node to
relay the message to the final destination node. For the model, I also assume
that all users are within transmission range of each other, so that any trans-
mission is heard by every user. Thus, when two or more users operate on
the same channel, they collide. However, users who operate on different fre-
quency channels, i.e., non-overlapping portion of spectrum, do not interfere
with each other.
All data communication is unicast, whereas control packets are broadcast
(the literature contains broadcast proposals that ensure availability [24–26]).
Because the overhead of a control message is amortized over the data frame,
and because I can choose arbitrarily large data frames, I assume that the
resource consumption of control communication is much smaller than that of
data communication (this makes the false reservation attack more efficient,
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as detailed in Section 4.2.2). Thus, I focus on the performance of data
communication.
All users have equal priority for transmission and their contributions to
the overall network performance are weighted equally. Thus, attackers do
not target a specific group of users, and, if their attacking strategy is limited
to jamming, then their optimal strategy becomes wideband jamming across
the frequency band utilized by legitimate users, as detailed in Section 4.2.2.
In order to prevent forgery of reservation messages, I authenticate control
packets containing channel reservation information by timestamping them
and including an authenticator based on a secret shared between an oﬄine
central authority and the requester. This eliminates spoofing attacks or
forgery of packets and ensures that a user is held responsible for the channels
it has reserved. I further assume that the central authority knows which users
are valid, which prevents the Sybil attack in which one entity fakes multiple
identities. (Sybil avoidance is not necessary for IFR-MAC that implements
resource-based channel allocation as opposed to entity-based allocation, but
it is assumed in DIFR-MAC when users aggregate their observations to agree
on a consensus bandwidth allocation.)
In contrast to the baseline strategy of entity-based bandwidth allocation,
IFR-MAC diverges from the conventional slotted channelization approach
(where the spectrum consists of channels with fixed bandwidth and static
location). In particular, by allocating channels with varying bandwidth and
center frequency, IFR-MAC can more effectively match the abilities of the
users when assigning bandwidth and increase the system’s spectral efficiency.
Researchers, in a non-security framework, have already adopted the chan-
nelization approach with flexible boundaries for frequency channels [30–33].
IFR-MAC does not require that users have the hardware capability of non-
contiguous frequency access [31–33], but I assume that attackers do have
such capability to describe the optimal attacker strategy and consider the
worst-case scenario as described in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.1 Performance Metric: Channel Capacity
The analysis for IFR-MAC holds when using any metric as long as it exhibits
the two properties that I use in the analysis: it is decreasing and convex
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Table 4.1: Variables and their meanings (listed in order of appearance)
Variable Notations
(lowercase subscripts indicate a network entity index)
T Set of non-idle transmitters
T Size of T
M Set of malicious transmitters
M Size of M
Wi User i’s bandwidth
i→ j Link between transmitter i and receiver j
Ri,j Rate performance of link i→ j
N0 Noise power spectral density
Pi,j Effective power of link i→ j
Px User x’s effective power constraint
Il User l’s normalized interference signal power
Jk User k’s normalized jamming power
P˜x User x’s transmitted power spectral density
W ∗i Bandwidth assigned to user i using IFR-MAC
P ∗i Signal power on channel reserved by user i
P ∗T Total signal power across frequency band
W Bandwidth of the entire frequency band
P Uniform power constraint, i.e., P , Px, ∀x ∈ T
α Attacker’s power allocated for false reservation
RC/RC User performance for centralized-IFR-MAC/DIFR-MAC
UC/UD Network performance for centralized-IFR-MAC/DIFR-MAC
β Bandwidth advantage of attacker due to collusion
U Aggregate network performance over time, i.e., U = ∑t U
αt Attacker’s power for false reservation at time t
αˆ Optimal choice for α
with jamming power, and monotonically increasing with transmitter’s signal
power. In this chapter, I use the Shannon channel capacity to construct the
performance metric.1 As a reference, I list the notation in Table 4.1.
Whenever user i transmits to its destination user j, it does so on a fre-
1The channel capacity given by the Shannon-Hartley theorem provides an asymp-
totic upper bound for the communication rate of an independent additive white Gaussian
(AWGN) channel. As is commonly used for evaluating performance and is generally con-
sidered tight (although researchers in information theory continue to pursue even tighter
bounds in more complex and realistic channel models), Shannon channel capacity is not
only simple and sufficiently expressive to demonstrate the performance of IFR-MAC and
DIFR-MAC but it also allows us to abstract away physical-layer decisions such as mod-
ulation, coding, and channel estimation. Nevertheless, the results hold when using any
metric that is monotone and convex, such as a more sophisticated capacity expression.
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quency channel, the location of which is pre-shared between user i and user
j. At any point in time, the user transmits on frequency channel with band-
width Wi. Under a flat fading Gaussian channel with Gaussian signals and
interference being treated as noise, the Shannon capacity of the link i → j
is:
Ri = Wi log2
1 + Pi,j
N0Wi +
∑
`6=i,`∈Mc
P`,j +
∑
k∈M
Pk,j
 (4.1)
In Equation 4.1, N0 is the power spectral density of noise,M are the indices
of jammers, Mc are the indices of legitimate users, and Px,y is the effective
or received signal power of the link x → y (the numerator is the transmit-
ter’s signal power while the denominator terms correspond to unintentional
interference and jamming).
Since the rate performance is determined at the intended receiver, I re-
construct the performance metric using received power (as opposed to the
transmitted power). First, I place finite power constraints to all users in-
cluding attackers (the constraint is denoted with Px where the subscript x
denotes the user index):
E[Px,y] ≤ Px <∞, ∀x ∈ T
Since Px,y is random due to the randomness in channel gain for x→ y, Px is
the upper constraint of the expected Px,y. As Ri is a monotonically increas-
ing function of Pi, the transmitter i (whose performance I am measuring)
will emit at full power and maximize the signal power Pi on the channel, i.e.,
E[Pi,j] = Pi. For the analysis, I assume that the channel gain across all chan-
nels have the same expected value (users with better channel gains can be
modeled by having a larger effective power constraint). From Equation 4.1,
this yields the following expression for the rate bound:
E[Ri] ≤ Wi log2
[
1 + Pi
N0Wi+
∑
6`=i,`∈Mc
I`P`+
∑
k∈M
JkPk
]
(4.2)
where Pi is the transmitter i’s signal power, I` is the amount of user `’s power
that interferes with the transmitter’s signal normalized with respect to the
power constraint P`, Jk is the attacker k’s jamming power normalized to the
44
power constraint, Pk (that is, I` and Jk are control variables indicating the
amount of power emitted by other users with respect to their constraints). I
use Equation 4.2 for the performance of link i→ j.
The system goal is to maximize the performance of the overall network.
I introduce a network utility function, U that is the aggregate rate of the
users:
U =
∑
i∈T
E[Ri] =
∑
i∈Mc
E[Ri] (4.3)
The second equality comes from the fact that the attackers make no contri-
bution to the network; they, in fact, aim to degrade the network performance
as described in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.2 Attack Model
Malicious attackers aim to degrade the network performance. Thus, I con-
sider an attacker that intends to minimize the utility function subject to its
power constraint:
minimize U subject to Jk ≤ 1, ∀k ∈M (4.4)
and that there is collusion among jammers. Thus, attackers learn and share
all information (including the secret key for control packets) through a se-
cure, covert communication path. Also, attackers do not care more about a
particular user than any other; that is, they do not target a specific subset
of users.
I am mainly concerned with two types of DoS attacks: false reservation
(wasting network resources) and jamming (injecting noise to decrease relia-
bility of communication). False reservation is the more efficient attack of the
two, since it allows an attacker to make a big impact while using less power.
Each attacker can send a short reservation request message and reserve a
channel for an extended period of time (which is supposedly to be used for
data transmission), preventing legitimate users from using the resource. This
requires only a small amount of power to deliver control packets (since there
is no measure to check or regulate whether the channel is used during the
reserved period) and attackers can use the majority of their power to jam
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and disrupt the communication of legitimate users. Therefore, attackers will
first falsely reserve the bandwidth as much as possible, and then jam the
rest of the transmissions on the frequency band that is being used by le-
gitimate users (attackers are capable of accessing non-contiguous frequency
band); focusing their jamming power on smaller bandwidth will yield greater
interference for users using the frequency band. In this case, attackers are
successful in both wasting resources by falsely reserving portions of spectrum
and degrading network performance by jamming the rest of the spectrum.
For the frequency band occupied by legitimate users, attackers need to
decide whether to choose narrowband jamming or wideband jamming. In
Equation 4.1, I observe that the capacity for link i → j, Ri is a decreasing
and convex function of the jamming power of attacker k, Pk,j. Hence, by
Jensen’s inequality, the minimum value of its statistical expectation E[Ri]
under the constraint in Equation 4.4, is attained by choosing E[P˜k(f)] for
every frequency f , where P˜k(f) is the user k’s transmitted power spectral
density at frequency f , e.g., Pk,j = α
∫ f+Wk/2
f−Wk/2 P˜k(f)df for some scalar chan-
nel gain α in a flat fading channel. Thus, to minimize the communication
rate, jammers will conduct wideband jamming across the channels that are
being used by all legitimate users as opposed to targeting and jamming a
specific set of users. Since attackers perform wideband jamming across the
entire frequency band except for the portion that they have already falsely
reserved (SWIFT [31] offers such wideband transmission avoiding some in-
band narrowband channels), legitimate users do not benefit from spreading
spectrum, e.g., via frequency hopping.
For each transmission period, all users need to agree on the same band-
width allocation to be coordinated. In scenarios where a centralized entity
does not exist, all users need an algorithm to reach consensus. This intro-
duces another vulnerability which attackers can exploit by attempting to
shift the coordination result to their advantages. This secondary attack on
distributed channel coordination is discussed in Section 4.4.1.
4.3 Ignore-False-Reservation MAC
For secure channel reservation, Ignore-False-Reservation MAC (IFR-MAC)
provides countermeasure for false reservation attack with two properties:
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first, it provides the optimal performance in terms of spectral efficiency,
and second, it generally causes the optimal power-finite attacker strategy
to become a jamming-only strategy. The IFR-MAC protocol thus performs
substantially better than the case in which no countermeasures are deployed,
since in those environments, an optimal attacker can simultaneously perform
false reservation and jamming, as described in Section 4.2.2.
The IFR-MAC bandwidth allocation scheme assigns bandwidth to a user
according to the received power from the user. I design two mechanisms for
determining and distributing this channel allocation: a centralized scheme
run by a trusted entity (IFR-MAC) and a distributed scheme in which
users cooperate to determine the bandwidth allocation (DIFR-MAC in Sec-
tion 4.4).
4.3.1 IFR-MAC Bandwidth Allocation
IFR-MAC assigns bandwidth according to the observed received power; that
is, each user is assigned bandwidth proportional to the amount of the user’s
effective power on the corresponding receiver. In other words, receiver only
respects a user’s channel request proportionally to the amount of power that
user emits on the data channel. Therefore, an attacker needs to emit power
on the reserved data channel in order to make a valid bandwidth reserva-
tion request for the following transmission. Thus, attackers’ limited power
capabilities force them to split their power between reserving channels and
jamming legitimate transmissions.
When attackers use their entire power to transmit on their reserved data
channels, I do not distinguish them from legitimate users. An attacker does
not care about its own bandwidth under the attacker model but instead
intends to minimize the bandwidth available to legitimate users. Thus, at-
tackers’ data transmissions do not contribute to the overall network perfor-
mance. However, the problem of detecting that an attacker’s data packets
are content-free is difficult (potentially impossible under certain encryption
schemes), so IFR-MAC does not attempt to identify attackers or their traffic.
Let Wi be the amount of transmission bandwidth assigned for user i. Sup-
pose the IFR-MAC bandwidth allocation scheme using observations on the
received power results in
−→
W ∗ = (W ∗1 , ...,W
∗
i , ...,W
∗
T ) where W
∗
i corresponds
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to the bandwidth allocated to user i, i.e., W ∗i ∝ P ∗i , where P ∗i denotes user
i’s power on its reserved bandwidth Wi. (P
∗
i 6= Pi, since P ∗i corresponds to
the actual power used for data communication on the reserved bandwidth
whereas Pi corresponds the power constraint; for example, an attacker can
use some of its power budget on jamming other channels.) Also, let P ∗T be the
total network power on the reserved channels, i.e., P ∗T =
∑
i∈T P
∗
i , and W be
the total bandwidth available for the network of users T . Since I do not want
to waste bandwidth, I allocate the entire frequency band, i.e.,
∑
i∈T W
∗
i = W .
Then, the scheme yields that W ∗i = W · P
∗
i
P ∗T
, ∀i ∈ T . Now, I claim that
the IFR-MAC bandwidth allocation scheme also yields optimal performance
(that is, it maximizes the network utility function, Equation 4.3).
Claim 3.
argmax
(W1,...,WT )
U =
−→
W ∗ =
(
W · P
∗
1
P ∗T
, ... ,W · P
∗
T
P ∗T
)
(4.5)
Proof. To simplify the proof, I examine the case where the channel gain
is equal across all channels, the noise power has equal power spectral den-
sity (N0) over all frequencies, and that the attackers choose a fixed strategy
(which I later show to be the optimal strategy in Section 4.5.2) between
false reservation and jamming with their limited power budget. If attackers
choose to jam, they conduct wideband jamming over narrowband jamming,
as described to be the more efficient attack in Section 4.2.2.
Using Equation 4.1 and Equation 4.3, I observe that U (which is a summa-
tion of E[Ri]) is a concave function with respect to Pi,j, and in a flat fading
environment, with respect to P˜i(f). Jensen’s inequality yields E[U(P˜i)] ≤
U(E[P˜i]). Therefore, in order to maximize the expected utility function, the
network needs to have constant power spectral density across the entire fre-
quency bandwidth W , i.e., P˜i(f) = E[P˜i(f)] =
P ∗T
W
, ∀f, ∀i. This is equivalent
to users’ transmission bandwidth being proportional to their power capabil-
ity, and yields Wi = W · P
∗
i
P ∗T
= W ∗i .
In one-user case, where user i is the sole member of the network, W ∗i = W
since P ∗i = P
∗
T , i.e., being the only member in the bandwidth allocation
process, user i consumes all the bandwidth available. The case for a bigger
network and more entities participating in the bandwidth allocation is equiv-
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alent to having a single user that has the same power capability as the sum
of that of the network (i.e., P ∗i =
∑
x∈T P
∗
x ), as the destination receiver does
not distinguish the source of the received power. Since I have the bandwidth
allocation non-overlapping, the proof on the previous paragraph extends to
the multi-user case.
The proof holds whether or not an attacker reserves a channel or jams the
frequency band. This is because attackers who transmit on their reserved
bandwidth for successful channel reservation, i.e., ∃i ∈ M, P ∗i 6= 0, are
indistinguishable from legitimate users, while attackers who wideband jam
the channels reserved by legitimate users increase the interference power
spectral density by the same amount for all frequency that they jam.
The claim continues to hold in expectation regardless of channel gain or the
distribution of the power spectral density of noise, e.g., frequency-selective
fading. This is intuitive because in expectation, “waterfilling” the spectrum
with power is known to maximize spectral efficiency.
4.3.2 IFR-MAC Channel Coordination
The bandwidth allocation scheme in Section 4.3.1 is performed individually
by each user. Before data transmission, all users need to agree on the same
bandwidth allocation, which process I call channel coordination. Otherwise,
their transmissions will overlap and cause collisions, resulting in poor per-
formance. In a centralized scheme, a trusted entity can simply determine
a bandwidth assignment (the trusted user performs channel coordination
within itself) and broadcast that assignment to the users. Section 4.4 in-
troduces a distributed counterpart of IFR-MAC channel coordination that
involves inter-user communication.
4.4 Distributed IFR-MAC
Distributed Ignore-False-Reservation MAC (DIFR-MAC) builds on the band-
width allocation scheme of IFR-MAC (described in Section 4.3.1) and extends
the scheme for distributed channel coordination. In scenarios where a trusted
entity does not exist or is oﬄine, the users need to share the observations and
reach consensus for channel coordination to avoid data collision. In DIFR-
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MAC, users exchange their power reports that contain their received power
observations. After gathering all users’ power reports using secure broad-
cast [24–26], users choose the median of the power observations. Since all
users choose the median from the same set of values, they reach consensus
(the solution to the Byzantine general’s problem using signed messages [34]
also provides the same result). I also propose a commit-and-reveal protocol
that conceals the power reports until all values are exchanged and gathered
by every users, the motivation and procedure for which is detailed in Sec-
tion 4.4.1.
4.4.1 DIFR-MAC against False Report Attack
Distributed channel coordination to reach consensus on bandwidth allocation
is vulnerable to an attack where attackers attempt to distort the consensus to
their advantage. I call this attack false report attack on distributed channel
coordination where attackers tamper the coordination process by reporting
false power reports. Such attack is inherent in a distributed algorithm where
attackers participate and contribute to the outcome. DIFR-MAC channel
coordination mitigates false report attack by using the median, an input-
resilient metric for coordination [35] (a non-robust metric such as mean gives
much control in channel coordination to attackers who report false power
observations). Nevertheless, since attackers know each other, they can still
distort the median by reporting favorable values (i.e., high received power
observations) for fellow attackers and low power for others. The false report
attack is difficult to detect because variable channel conditions by fading
causes the reported observations of received power to vary between all users.
The result of the attack is that the consensus median value will be shifted
toward the value that the attackers report. Also, the use of median introduces
an additional constraint that must be placed on the number of attackers:
M < T
2
(this constraint is not necessary in a centralized scheme); otherwise,
the attackers outnumber legitimate users and has direct control over the
median and thus the channel coordination outcome.
Attackers that know the legitimate users’ received power observations know
exactly the median value and the maximum possible distortion. I hide the
legitimate users’ reports of received power values by committing the reported
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values and then revealing them after all reports are gathered. Using a one-
way hash function, a commit-and-reveal protocol conceals the power obser-
vations until all reports are broadcasted and gathered. In DIFR-MAC, the
committed value is the hash of the power report and the corresponding hash
function while the revealed value is the power report itself; only after all the
committed values are broadcasted will users reveal the received power.
An attacker detection scheme using thresholds can prevent attackers from
reporting extremely large or small values. However, even with a scheme that
hides the legitimate users’ reports, such a threshold-based detection scheme
can be defeated by attackers who infer other legitimate users’ observations
based on the past reports. Attackers can then decide how much to distort the
median by reporting moderately biased values while avoiding being detected.
Not only is a threshold-based detection scheme ineffective, it can also result in
performance-degrading false positives; when the attacker is intelligent, such
a detection scheme will mostly detect legitimate, unintentional outliers, and
may degrade the future performance by punishing benign users. Therefore,
I do not consider such detection schemes.
4.5 Theoretical Analysis
IFR-MAC reduces the problem of false reservations to a two-party game
between the legitimate user network (users who wish to maximize network
utility) and the attacker network (entities who want to degrade network per-
formance), because I assume cooperative behavior among benign users and
collusion among attackers, and because the bandwidth allocation depends
only on the received power.
IFR-MAC allocates bandwidth proportional to each node’s power level.
The IFR-MAC’s behavior, and the attacker’s optimal strategy, therefore de-
pend on the relative power capabilities of the legitimate and attacker net-
works, rather than on the number of users. In the theoretical analysis, I
consider nodes with equal power constraints; that is, all individual users,
including attackers, have the same power constraint P¯ , i.e., Pi = P¯ , ∀i ∈ T .
Then, the power capability ratio of the legitimate user network to that of the
attacker network is T−M
M
, so the power capabilities of the two groups can be
controlled by varying the number of users (T ) and attackers (M). I denote
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the expected performance of individual users as RC = E[Ri], ∀i ∈ T , in the
centralized IFR-MAC scheme, and with RD in the DIFR-MAC scheme. For
simplicity of analysis, I introduce a variable α to represent the fraction of
attacker power expended on channels reserved by the attacker, so that 1−α
represents the fraction of attacker power used for jamming other channels.
4.5.1 IFR-MAC Performance
In the centralized scheme, the trusted entity makes its own observations
and assigns bandwidth to users accordingly; thus control traffic flows only
between the trusted entity and the nodes. In this section, I study the network
performance of the centralized IFR-MAC scheme. Since the attacker network
uses (α · P¯ ·M) power for false reservation (and [(1 − α) · P¯ ·M ] power for
jamming), a legitimate user can reserve bandwidth Wi =
W
T−M+Mα , where
the denominator T − (1− α)M represents the number of valid reservations.
This reduces Equation 4.2 into:
RC = W
T −M +Mα · log2
1 + P¯
W ·N0
T−M+Mα +
M(1−α)P¯
(T−M)

=
W
T −M +Mα log2
1 + SNR
T
T−M+Mα +
M(1−α)
(T−M) SNR

where the signal-to-noise ratio SNR is the ratio between the network power
capability (including that of the insider attackers) and the natural noise on
the entire frequency band (SNR = T ·P¯
W ·N0 ). Using Equation 4.3,
UC = (T −M) · RC
Combining both equations,
UC =
(T −M) ·W
T −M +Mα log2
1 + SNR
T
T−M+Mα +
M(1−α)
(T−M) SNR

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4.5.2 Attacker Reaction to IFR-MAC
Section 4.3 describes IFR-MAC, which forces attackers to use a channel in
order to reserve channels in the future. This section presents the following
result about the optimal attacker strategy in IFR-MAC: attackers will use a
static strategy (α is constant in time) to minimize the network utility. Let
U be the aggregate network utility over time, i.e., U = ∑t Ut where Ut is the
network performance (expressed in Equation 4.3) at time t, and let αt be the
amount of power attackers use to reserve a channel rather than jamming at
time t.
Claim 4. Given αˆ that yields minimum U ,
αt = αˆ, ∀t, yields the minimum performance, U .
Proof. I use the network utility function expression for the centralized scheme
UC in this proof (the proof for distributed scheme follows the same proce-
dure). From Equation 4.6, both (T−M)·W
T−M+Mα and log2
1 + SNR
T
T−M+Mα+
M(1−α)
(T−M) SNR
 are
convex, monotonic, and positive for all possible α. Therefore, the prod-
uct, Uc is also convex with respect to α. By using Jensen’s inequality,
αt = E[αˆ] = αˆ, ∀t yields the minimum network performance, U .
4.5.3 DIFR-MAC Performance
Without an online trusted authority, channel coordination becomes a dis-
tributed problem. In this section, I describe DIFR-MAC, which takes the
median of each user’s measurement to obtain a consensus bandwidth alloca-
tion, as described in Section 4.3.2. I also consider the false reporting attack
described in Section 4.4.1, where attackers report receiving less power from
legitimate users and more power received from colluding attackers. The user
is assigned channel bandwidth proportional to the median of the power re-
ports. I use β to denote the attacker’s bandwidth advantage over a legitimate
user; as discussed in Section 4.4.1, attackers can reserve more bandwidth than
legitimate users with the same amount of power (β ≥ 1) because attackers
can collude while legitimate users report truthfully.
Because the power a node receives from another node fluctuates due to
channel condition, legitimate nodes report different power levels for the same
transmission. An attacker can shift the median by reporting an extreme
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value. Without any attackers, the median returns the 50th percentile mea-
surement for each transmitter. When assessing the data transmission power
of colluding attacker, attackers report large power observations, shifting the
observed median upward to the 100 · 0.5·T
T−M > 50 percentile of legitimate ob-
servations. Also, for a legitimate user’s power report, the attackers report
low power to shift the median downward to the 100 · 0.5·T−M
T−M < 50 percentile
of legitimate observations. In contrast, legitimate users report their true
observations that include random wireless channel fluctuation. Assuming a
channel model with independent and identically distributed channels for all
users, where each channel characterized by a cumulative distribution function
CDF, the bandwidth advantage of an attacker is:
β =
CDF−1( 0.5·T
T−M )
CDF−1(0.5·T−M
T−M )
(4.6)
I consider three channel fading models, where channel characteristics vary
in Rician fading with parameters ν and σ, where ν2 is the power of the
line-of-sight path2 and 2σ2 is the power of the other, scattered paths. In
specific, I study three cases for channel fading characteristics: strong line-
of-sight ( ν
σ
= 10), weak line-of-sight ( ν
σ
= 2), no line-of-sight ( ν
σ
= 0). The
no line-of-sight case is equivalent to the Rayleigh fading model, a typical
model used in highly dynamic environments, such as a mobile application in
an urban setting.
I plot the attacker bandwidth advantage β under each of the three channel
fading models in Figure 4.1. Increasing the number of attackers results in
greater error in the computed median, resulting in less-correct bandwidth
assignment and greater bandwidth advantage. Because channel fluctuation
affects the randomness within the power reports, the attacker’s bandwidth
advantage β depends on ν
σ
; as the line-of-sight path becomes less dominant,
the attackers gain additional bandwidth.
Under the false reporting attack, one legitimate node’s bandwidth is one
part in T−M+αβM , since T−M is the number of legitimate users and αβM
is the effective requests made by attackers, resulting in per-user performance
(RD) and network performance (UD) of:
2As is common in wireless communications, the term line-of-sight path refers to the
most dominant channel path, and not necessarily the straight-line path between the two
nodes.
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Figure 4.1: Ratio of attacker’s and legitimate user’s bandwidth under false
report attack against DIFR-MAC
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RD = W
T −M +Mαβ log2
1 + SNR
T
T−M+Mαβ +
M(1−α)
(T−M) SNR

UD =
(T −M) ·W
T −M +Mαβ log2
1 + SNR
T
T−M+Mαβ +
M(1−α)
(T−M) SNR

Compared to the centralized scheme, the distributed scheme, DIFR-MAC
gives attackers an additional factor of β more bandwidth.
4.6 Testbed Evaluations
To complement the theoretical analysis in Section 4.5, I use testbed im-
plementation and computer simulation to study the effectiveness of the IFR-
MAC bandwidth allocation and the DIFR-MAC channel coordination scheme.
The testbed implementation is built on the WARP software-defined radio
platforms [27] (Section 4.6), and the simulation is built on MATLAB (Sec-
tion 4.7).
4.6.1 Evaluation Methodology
I compare the performance of IFR-MAC to a baseline protocol with no coun-
termeasure. In the baseline protocol, attackers can reserve channels without
using power on the channels they are allocated; the frequency band is di-
vided equally into multiple channels; and each user gets one channel. Op-
timal strategy against this baseline protocol, as detailed in Section 4.2.2, is
for attackers to reserve channels, wasting M
T
of the entire network bandwidth
without consuming much power (I assume that control packets are consid-
erably smaller than data packets, so that the power required to transmit
control packets is negligible). For the baseline strategy, α = 0 represents
the optimal baseline strategy, since α does not affect channel reservation (as
discussed in Section 4.6.4).
In implementation, I use four WARP (Wireless Open Access Research)
software-defined radio platforms [27]. Using the MIMO (multiple input mul-
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tiple output) capability of the platform, I simulate a network comprised of
four transmitters: two legitimate transmitters, one attacker, and one identity-
only attacker with zero power. The legitimate transmitters and the attacker
each have equal power budget (except when I vary the attacker power budget
in Section 4.6.4). For the centralized IFR-MAC analysis, I fix one receiver
to be the destination of the data packets and the trusted authority that
performs IFR-MAC bandwidth allocation and channel coordination. Fur-
thermore, I manually calibrate the antenna locations so that the receiver
observes approximately the same power from each transmitter. For DIFR-
MAC, I consider three equal-power transmitters and pair each transmitter
with a receiver on a separate WARP board to simulate full duplex.3 (Sec-
tion 4.6.5 gives a detailed description of the DIFR-MAC implementation.)
To maximize network utility U , each node maintains full queues and con-
tinuously transmits. At the physical layer, nodes use differential quadrature
phase-shift keying (DQPSK) modulation with a BPSK-modulated Barker
sequence preamble. The total network bandwidth is 12 MHz wide and di-
vided into 300 subchannels using orthogonal frequency division multiplexing
(OFDM). Each transmitter sends random bits to its receiver, and its receiver
demodulates the received signal and uses the bit error rate to estimate the
effective signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) at the receiver, using
the equation from [28,29]:
BER =
1
2
1− √2 · SINR√
1 + 4 · SINR + 2 · SINR2

For performance evaluation, I compute the network’s aggregate capacity
from the effective SINR using Equation 4.1 and Equation 4.3 and then the
network’s spectral efficiency by dividing the aggregate capacity by the total
network bandwidth (although the compromised node can waste some of the
bandwidth).
3WARP version 2 does not support duplex because the antennas and the radio front-
ends on a board partially share the processing chain preventing them from transmitting
and receiving at the same time.
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4.6.2 IFR-MAC Bandwidth Convergence
I study the bandwidth allocations under the two attacker strategies of α = 0
(jamming) and α = 1 (effective channel reservation). IFR-MAC allocates the
entire network bandwidth, and each user’s channel bandwidth is proportional
to the observation of the power originated from the user. I model an opti-
mal attacker, which means the attacker uses a fixed strategy (as described
in Section 4.5.2). Figure 4.2(a) shows the expected normalized bandwidth
allocation to the four transmitters over time. Beginning from the baseline
strategy of equal-bandwidth allocation (i.e., each of the four entities occupy
1
4
of the network bandwidth), IFR-MAC quickly converges to the steady-
state bandwidth allocation, where the delay is caused by the noise in the
spectrum reserved by attackers (noise power monotonically increases with
bandwidth). Within two rounds of updates, IFR-MAC converges to the
steady-state bandwidth allocation. I also plot legitimate-user bandwidth, the
fraction of bandwidth utilized by the legitimate network and thus contribute
to the network throughput, which converges to 1 and to 2
3
, respectively, for
α = 0 and for α = 1, validating the steady-state theoretical results. Fur-
thermore, the identity-only attacker quickly converges to zero bandwidth as
it emits no power, and thus has no impact on network performance under
IFR-MAC. The identity-only attacker, whose strategy is independent of α
(because it has no power), gets bandwidth identical to that of the power-
capable attacker with α = 0. Figure 4.2(a) shows that even when attackers
collude by having the jammer emit power on the identity-only attacker’s
reserved spectrum, IFR-MAC still converges quickly.
4.6.3 Attacker Power-Splitting Strategy
Against IFR-MAC, an attacker with a finite power budget can choose to
jam (α = 0), make effective bandwidth reservations (α = 1), or split power
between the two strategies (0 < α < 1). I study the network performance
with varying attacker strategy and present the results in Figure 4.2(b). These
results show that for IFR-MAC (and DIFR-MAC) bandwidth allocation,
jamming is more detrimental than consuming power on the reserved channel
for effective reservation, so the optimal attacker strategy is jamming (α =
0). However, in Section 4.7 where I study the optimal attacker strategy
58
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Time (update)
R
e
s
e
rv
e
d
 b
a
n
d
w
id
th
 
 
Legitimate-user bandwidth (=0)
Legitimate-user bandwidth (=1)
Identity-only attacker (=0)
Power-capable attacker (=0)
Power-capable attacker (=1)
(a) Bandwidth utilization normalized by the total
network bandwidth
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Attacker strategy, 
N
e
tw
o
rk
 c
a
p
a
c
it
y
 (
b
p
s
/H
z
)
 
 
Baseline
IFR-MAC
(b) IFR-MAC performance with α
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Legitimate-to-attacker power ratio (dB)
N
e
tw
o
rk
 c
a
p
a
c
it
y
 (
b
p
s
/H
z
)
 
 
Baseline (=0)
Baseline (=1)
IFR-MAC (=0)
IFR-MAC (=1)
(c) Varying legitimate power relative to attacker power
for α = 0 and α = 1
Figure 4.2: IFR-MAC implementation testbed results
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with more complex network settings, I see that there are cases that the
optimal attacker strategy diverges from only jamming. Here I sketch an
intuition for IFR-MAC. For a given α, the ratio between legitimate user
power and jammer power on each channel is constant regardless of legitimate
user bandwidth. Thus, in high SNR regions, the performance gain of IFR-
MAC over the baseline strategy is proportional to the legitimate network
bandwidth utilization and decreases with increasing α.
4.6.4 Attacker Power Budget
In this section, I vary the attacker power budget while fixing the legitimate
user’s power (the identity-only attacker retains zero power budget). Since
the optimal attacker uses all of its power budget to degrade network perfor-
mance, varying the power budget directly affects the legitimate-to-attacker
power ratio experienced by each receiver. I consider the ratio of power be-
tween a single legitimate user and the single attacker. Figure 4.2(c) plots the
aggregate capacity performance against the legitimate-to-attacker power ra-
tio. Larger legitimate-to-attacker power ratios result in better performance;
when the attacker is jamming (α = 0), this performance increase comes from
reduced interference, and when the attacker is reserving (α = 1), this perfor-
mance increase comes from increased bandwidth. Fixing the MAC strategy
(e.g., either baseline or IFR-MAC), α = 0 provides worse performance than
α = 1, as predicted in Section 4.6.3. Results show that incremental power in-
creases are best spent on jamming: nonzero values of α show less impact with
increasing power. Since attacker can do much greater damage by jamming,
α = 0 is the optimal baseline strategy for the attackers.
4.6.5 DIFR-MAC Channel Coordination
In contrast to the centralized IFR-MAC, where a trusted entity (such as the
receiver of uplink traffic) decides on the bandwidth allocation and announces
it to the transmitters, in DIFR-MAC, the transmitters need to determine the
bandwidth allocation among themselves. DIFR-MAC allocates bandwidth
by computing the median of the observed power levels; each transmitter
observes power levels by using full-duplex radio techniques [36]. The imple-
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mentation pairs two radio chains from distinct WARP boards to simulate
duplex. Whereas current work in full duplex wireless attempts to maximally
cancel the sender signal to minimize self-interference, DIFR-MAC wants to
achieve a fixed attenuation in order to estimate the relative power levels
of the transmitters. The techniques for achieving fixed attenuation, or for
digitally re-creating the eliminated interference, is beyond the scope of the
dissertation. I bypass such calibration through the use of separate radios
for transmission and reception, and by placing the receiving antennas so
that they experience approximately the same amount of transmitter power
from all transmitters. An alternative algorithm, which is also reflected by
the testbed setup, is that each transmitter node has its distinct, designated
receiver node, that helps in channel coordination by deciding on the power
observation and having the transmitter relay the power report (in which
case, the power report is compromised if the transmitter or the receiver is
compromised).
In distributed channel coordination, attackers are vulnerable to the false
reporting attack. Even though median-based DIFR-MAC channel coordina-
tion mitigates the false power report attack, as discussed in Section 4.4.1, it
performs worse than the centralized IFR-MAC channel coordination which is
unaffected by false reports. To show the persisting effect of the false reporting
attack on DIFR-MAC, Figure 4.3(a) compares the bandwidth utilization of
IFR-MAC and DIFR-MAC when attackers focus either on making successful
false reservations (α = 1) or jamming (α = 0), and Figure 4.3(b) compares
the capacity performance of IFR-MAC and DIFR-MAC. Comparing the two
results, I observe that the performance difference between DIFR-MAC and
IFR-MAC arises mostly from the impact of false reports on channel band-
width coordination. The results show that DIFR-MAC performs better than
the baseline despite the persistent effect of false power report attack. Finally,
I observe that DIFR-MAC shifts the attacker’s optimal power-splitting strat-
egy from α = 0, the optimal strategy against IFR-MAC. Section 4.7 continues
the evaluation of DIFR-MAC in a mobile environment.
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4.7 Simulation Evaluations
In Section 4.6, I showed the results from implementing IFR-MAC and DIFR-
MAC on software-defined radios; I demonstrated that the schemes were prac-
tical and that they provide a performance advantage over the na¨ıve baseline
strategy of identity-based channel allocation; I also confirmed the theoretical
determinations about optimal attacker strategy. To demonstrate scalability,
I use MATLAB to simulate a more complicated network topology and chan-
nel fading environment. I simulate a network with equal-power transmitters
and compute the bandwidth utilization and SINR, from which I derive the
aggregate capacity performance (based on the theoretical analysis in Sec-
tion 4.5). To capture the game between the legitimate network and the
attacker network, I vary the network parameters and study their effect on
IFR-MAC and DIFR-MAC. The parameters are: T = 100 transmitters, SNR
(without interference) = 15 dB, W = 20 MHz, and the number of malicious
entities M is varied and shown in the plots. In the DIFR-MAC study, net-
work users are capable of full duplex transmissions, and I model the channel
as an i.i.d. AWGN channel with Rayleigh fading, which emulates a highly
dynamic environment, such as mobile applications in urban setting.
As discussed in Section 4.5, the relative power capabilities of legitimate
user network and attacker network affects the performance of the IFR-MAC
bandwidth allocation scheme. I observe that attacker network has a M
T
frac-
tion of the entire power consumption of the network, while legitimate users
have T−M
T
.
Using the performance metric of network capacity (mathematically ex-
pressed in Equation 4.3), I analyze the performance ratio between the aggre-
gate rate of IFR-MAC/DIFR-MAC and the aggregate rate of the baseline
performance. In particular, I use the performance ratio over the optimal
baseline strategy, which is that attackers jam (α = 0). Since I use perfor-
mance ratio, the number of legitimate users (T − M) becomes irrelevant;
rather, the metric corresponds to the improvement observed by each user as
compared to the baseline strategy with no countermeasure. I also study the
optimal attacker reactions to IFR-MAC and DIFR-MAC where αˆ denotes
the optimal power-splitting strategy.
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4.7.1 IFR-MAC Performance
Unsurprisingly, the rate performance suffers as the attacker network increases
its power capability of M , given T . On the other hand, Figure 4.4(a) plots
performance ratio over the optimal baseline strategy while varying the at-
tacker power-splitting strategy of α (the optimal baseline strategy has a
constant performance across the x-axis since attackers only perform jam-
ming and α = 0), IFR-MAC not only outperforms the baseline performance
in all possible scenarios (performance ratio is always greater than one) but
also provides greater resistance to attacks with increasing attacker capability
(performance ratio increases as M increases).
When the power capability of the attacker network is smaller than that
of the legitimate user network, attackers’ optimal strategy is to jam with all
their power (α = 0). Thus, the optimal attacker strategy αˆ is to jam with all
of its power (αˆ = 0), which agrees with out testbed studies in Section 4.6.3.
However, as aggregate attacker power reaches and exceeds aggregate legit-
imate user power, αˆ > 0 (using some power to reserve channels) becomes
the optimal attacker strategy. For example, in Figure 4.4(a), when attackers
have as much power capability as the legitimate users, i.e., M = 50 out of
T = 100, attackers will transmit on data channels with αˆ = 0.2 of their
power capability, in order to obtain some valid channel reservations, and use
the rest of the power 1 − αˆ = 0.8 to jam the rest of the channels, on which
the legitimate users transmit. The optimal attacker strategy diverges from
α = 0, since jamming has a logarithmic impact on network performance
while reservations have a linear impact on network performance. Therefore,
as attackers’ power capabilities grow, the marginal impact of reserving and
consuming bandwidth exceeds that of jamming legitimate transmissions.
In order to better compare the optimal attacker strategy and pure jam-
ming, Figure 4.4(c), varies the fraction of attacker nodes in the network and
studies the attack optimality of pure jamming by plotting the performance
ratio between the optimal attacker strategy (that minimizes the network per-
formance), α = αˆ, and that when attackers jam at full power, α = 0. Thus,
the metric indicates how much pure jamming underachieves the attacker’s
goal of degrading the network performance compared to the optimal power-
splitting strategy. When normal users outnumber malicious users, and thus
legitimate user channels have sufficiently good quality, jamming (α = 0) is
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an optimal or near-optimal strategy. In particular, αˆ = 0 until about 45% of
the network nodes are compromised, and there is only 2.5% difference in per-
formance between α = 0 and α = αˆ = 0.2 when half the nodes are malicious
(M = T −M = 50). Therefore, in most practical scenarios (where attack-
ers do not substantially outnumber legitimate users) α = 0 is the optimal
jammer strategy or is negligibly suboptimal.
4.7.2 DIFR-MAC Performance
DIFR-MAC scheme has similar properties to those of its centralized coun-
terpart. However, from Figure 4.4(b), I observe that the optimal attacker
strategy diverges from α = 0 more than in the centralized scheme due to
the false reporting attack on distributed channel coordination, described in
Section 4.4.1. For example, when M = 30, α = 0.24 is the optimal strategy
for distributed scheme (Figure 4.4(b)) whereas α = 0 is the optimal attacker
behavior in the centralized scheme (Figure 4.4(a)). From Figure 4.4(c) that
displays the attack optimality of pure jamming, αˆ = 0 if less than 27% of
network is compromised by attackers. Also, as discussed in Section 4.4.1,
reserving any bandwidth (α > 0) yields complete control on bandwidth al-
location to the attacker if M
T
≤ 0.5.
When compared to IFR-MAC, DIFR-MAC has less performance gain over
the baseline performance (as shown in Figure 4.4(b)) due to the false power
reporting attack. Also unlike the the centralized scheme, DIFR-MAC’s per-
formance can be worse than the baseline strategy as the number of attackers
(M) increases. For example, in Figure 4.4(b), M = 45 results in performance
ratio of less than one for some α. This reduced performance arises from the
bandwidth advantage that comes from the false reporting attack, which grows
quickly as M increases. As shown in Figure 4.1, when M = 45, the attacker
can reserve five times as much bandwidth than legitimate users if the same
amount of power is used for reservation (β = 5). Therefore, as the number
of attackers approaches the number of legitimate users, DIFR-MAC becomes
less effective, and attackers have total control over the scheme if they have as
many as or are greater in number than legitimate users, as described in Sec-
tion 4.4.1. However, DIFR-MAC only exhibits poor performance when the
number of malicious users approaches 50%; before DIFR-MAC breaks down
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due to the false-reporting attack, DIFR-MAC effectively prevents the false
reservation. For example, even when 30% of nodes are attackers, DIFR-MAC
provides nearly a 40% performance improvement over the baseline strategy.
4.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter studies the false reservation attack, where attacker reserves
bandwidth without the intention of using it and uses its remaining power to
jam legitimate transmissions. IFR-MAC defends against the false reserva-
tion attack by allocating channel bandwidth based on received power obser-
vations, and not only effectively counters false reservations, but also yields
optimal performance. I design both centralized IFR-MAC and its distributed
counterpart DIFR-MAC to perform power-fair bandwidth allocation. The
evaluations show that, in practical scenarios, both IFR-MAC and DIFR-
MAC force the rational attacker into a jamming-only strategy, or result in
performance similar to the jamming-only scenario. These protocols thus pro-
vide considerable improvement over allowing false channel reservations in the
na¨ıve identity-based channel allocation scheme.
67
CHAPTER 5
PHYSICAL LAYER BACKGROUND
This chapter provides a primer for wireless communication with focus on the
physical layer, where logical symbols (typically bits in computer applications)
get converted into physical signal that is suitable for propagation on the
communication medium. It also presents the physical-layer framework and
defines the terms that I use to describe RONS in Chapter 6.
5.1 Adding Redundancy (in Information-Theoretical
Sense)
In coding, communication systems add redundancy by generating multiple
bits that contain duplicate messages to mitigate the impact of failed delivery
on communication reliability. After coding, at the physical layer (where
discrete-time communication systems are limited in sampling rate), even
though the information theoretically optimal strategy is to have all samples
carry discrete, non-overlapping information content,1 system designers fur-
ther add redundancy in real-life communication practice by having redundant
samples that carry overlapping information content as opposed to having all
samples contain distinct information content. Transmitters add redundancy
by spreading symbols over multiple samples via one-to-many mapping; that
is, an input symbol entering the physical layer becomes mapped into multiple
samples (and eventually to analog continuous signal) when leaving the trans-
mitter chain. Although adding redundancy increases the processing load, it
is commonly used to effectively deal with the real-life physical characteris-
tics of the channel medium: to combat noise and incorporate error control,
1In a high SINR-regime, the capacity grows linearly with the transmission rate but
grows logarithmically with SINR, and the maximum benefit of adding redundant symbols
increases the SINR linearly by the number of samples that the information content spreads
across, example of which technique is discussed in Section 6.5.1
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Figure 5.1: Typical transmitter processing chain at the physical layer
to nullify channel fading and synchronization imprecision/error, and to fit
the transmissions to the channel constraints, e.g., frequency bandwidth. The
channel constraints also come from sharing the medium with other communi-
cation users and can either be decided at the application layer by legislative
enforcement or at the link layer from a medium access control (MAC) proto-
col. Thus, I extend the notion of redundancy beyond coding (with its typical
error control and reliability purpose) and use the term in the information-
theoretical sense; the extra samples that carry overlapping or duplicate in-
formation content are redundant in information theory but may be necessary
to meet the real-life constraints.
I call the physical-layer processing blocks that perform one-to-many map-
ping, and therefore dilute the amount of information content per sample,
redundancy blocks and the number of outputs of the redundancy block per
input redundancy rate. Redundancy blocks perform two operations: up-
conversion and profile mixing. Up-conversion, or oversampling maps an in-
put into multiple outputs by repetition. The block then mixes the signal
with a profile, which defines the redundancy block mapping. In Section 5.2,
I present a typical radio chain design and present examples of redundancy
blocks.
5.2 Basic Transmitter Design
Figure 5.1 shows a typical standard block design of a radio chain that uses
phase modulation (PM) and/or amplitude modulation (AM) as the param-
eter control choice for the modulation scheme. In the chronological order, a
basic transmitter processing chain consists of blocks that perform the follow-
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ing functionalities: constellation mapping, I/Q modulation (or quadrature
modulation), baseband-to-passband mixer, a digital-to-analog filter, and a
radio-frequency (RF) frontend. The constellation mapping block performs
bit-to-symbol mappings. Called M-ary modulation, it takes log2(M) number
of bits and convert them into M distinct symbols (greater alphabet size of
M provides better bit-throughput rate but also increases the symbol sus-
ceptibility to error caused by channel/circuit noise). The next block is the
quadrature modulation which takes two quadrature carriers for modulation;
typically a sine wave generates the real (I) channel while the cosine wave
generates the complex (Q) channel (sinusoidal carriers are used due to their
ease of generation). Afterward, a mixer that modulates baseband envelope
signal with another sinusoidal with RF frequency converts the signal from
baseband to passband and adjusts the transmission’s center frequency. Then,
the signal goes through a digital-to-analog (DAC) filter, which modulates the
signal with a pulse that is designed to fit the signal into the given channel
bandwidth, before entering the analog domain of RF frontend (which outputs
the signal as an electromagnetic propagation).
Even though it is theoretically impossible to have a time-constrained signal
constrained in frequency and vice versa, the pulse shaping DAC filter is
designed to minimize the transmission impact beyond the channel. Using
a filter to control the bandwidth overspill is very typical among legitimate
devices, which adhere to the FCC regulations on spectral mask that controls
the bandwidth overspill beyond the channel, which specify the minimum
power attenuation outside the accessed frequency band. Due to its common
use, I focus on applying RONS on the redundancy block of DAC pulse-
shaping filter for evaluations of RONS in Section 6.6.
In this standard design of the transmitter chain, there are three redun-
dancy blocks: the quadrature (I/Q) modulation block, the DAC filter, and,
optionally (if transmitter hardware sampling can support additional redun-
dancy), the RF mixer. The redundancy profile for the quadrature (I/Q)
modulation is the sinusoidal with the local frequency and that for the DAC
filter is the pulse specified by the transmitter.
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5.3 Receiver Design
I assume linear receiver and treat interference (both self-interference from
fading and external interference from other transmitters) as random noise.
At a high level, given a bit-to-samples mapping of the transmitter chain, the
corresponding correct receiver that results in zero error with certain amount
of channel uncertainty (degree of which depends on the redundancy added,
for example, for error correction) performs an inverse mapping to the trans-
mitter chain. With the receiver processing blocks operating in the reverse-
chronological order as their counterparts on the transmitter chain, the notion
of inverse mapping is straightforward for the processing blocks that perform
an injective one-to-one mapping (in other words, they are not redundancy
blocks). For the inversion of the other redundancy blocks, the receiver uses a
soft-decision correlator and minimum mean squared error (MMSE) decision
rule for samples-to-symbol mapping. When noise and interference’s statis-
tics are invariant of time, MMSE reduces into matched filter (the receiver
performs the inverse mapping using the same profile that has been used by
the transmitter). Matched filter is also SINR-optimal in Gaussian channels
and is independent of both channel state (e.g., does not require channel es-
timation) and the interferers’ strategies. Thus, to demodulate and decode
the received signal, the receiver needs to know now not only the exact trans-
mitter chain/strategy but also the profiles that the transmitter uses for the
mapping.
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CHAPTER 6
REDUNDANCY OFFSET NARROW
SPECTRUM
6.1 Chapter Overview
Due to the inherent nature of sharing the medium, wireless communication
is vulnerable to signal injection. Correlated jamming, introduced in the
1980s as the information-theoretically optimal interference signal, aims to
cancel the target victim signal in contrast to the more traditional jamming
approach of adding noise-like interference. The recent surge of antenna-
cancellation based technology in a non-security context (including full duplex
radio technology using MIMO antennas) has reignited interest in correlated
jamming in wireless security. Successful attack of complete cancellation yields
zero information about the source transmission signal to the victim receiver
and the receiver strategy of recovering bits reduces into coin toss with equal
weight. The information about the victim transmission that makes correlated
jamming possible also yields easy access to the messages that has been relayed
from above the physical layer and compromise the message integrity.
Correlated jamming utilizes antenna-based signal cancellation. In a non-
security framework, the field of full duplex with multiple antennas uses such
signal cancelation technique; they cancel the signal being transmitted at the
receiver location, so that it does not interfere with the receiver reception [36].
In wireless security, others have used the technique in a white-hat approach
where friendly jamming is used as a defense mechanism for confidentiality
against eavesdroppers [37]; correlated jamming, on the other hand, assumes
a malicious adversary who injects wireless interference to disrupt communi-
cation. As has been demonstrated in prior work in full duplex and friendly
jamming, one of the key challenges for signal cancellation is synchronization
between the jammer and the target transmitter. Thus, I study the impact
of synchronization offsets and compare correlated jamming, coded jamming
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(that does not need to follow the target transmission real-time), and Gaussian
jamming. However, to devise a countermeasure against wireless interference,
I assume the strongest threat of correlated jamming.
Typical spreading spectrum solutions against jamming assumes dividing
the medium into multiple orthogonal channels and involves channel access
randomization [19, 20], so that the choice of accessed channel (among many
channel options) is random against attackers; a reactive attacker that ob-
serves the victim’s channel access and adjust its strategy accordingly can be
thwarted by switching channels and having the access duration on a channel
be smaller than the attacker’s reaction time. Spreading spectrum assumes
channelization that provides orthogonal channel access by interleaving the
channel use either by time, frequency, or code (processing) and can be effec-
tive in ensuring both confidentiality and availability by having the random
spreading code/key (from which the channel access information is derived)
known only between the source-destination pair involved in the communica-
tion. However, spreading spectrum bears a spreading cost. In other words,
the wireless users consume more resource than no spreading by a factor that is
proportional to the number of channel options that the users have for channel
access, because the process of spreading symbols entitles either transmitting
redundant information (in case of code-based spreading) or reserving more
resource than the user uses at a time (in cases of frequency or time-based
spreading), and thus has a negative impact on the throughput rate perfor-
mance.
I introduce a novel physical-layer technology, Redundancy Offset Narrow
Spectrum (RONS), that effectively counters both passive and active wire-
less attacks. RONS is narrowband spectrum since it does not require the
spreading cost of consuming wireless resource proportionally to spreading
gain; it uses the built-in physical-layer blocks of the communication chain
but only adds phase offsets or cyclic delays (which values are only known
among the legitimate key holders). Fully implemented at the physical layer,
RONS also does not rely on randomization of the physical channel access.
In other words, RONS counters threats even when the attacker knows the
physical channel location of the signal transmission; in fact, I assume that
the attacker does not waste its power accessing other channel to model the
worst-case impact.
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6.2 System Model and Assumptions
Due to the wide adoption in wireless communication community, I design
RONS based on the basic communication design described in Section 5.2 and
the receiver strategy in Section 5.3. The transmitter-receiver pair a priori
agrees on a secure key [24, 26]. However, there is no collision-preventing
channel coordination between the simultaneous transmitters at the medium
access control (MAC) layer (MAC-layer approach to mitigate interference is
an active field [8] and its physical layer counterparts for orthogonal medium
access are described in Section 6.5.1).
Assuming an additive white Gaussian wireless channel model with numer-
ous noise sources and limited fading with clear line-of-sight channel path
(e.g., for evaluation in Section 6.6, RONS uses filtering that is robust to fad-
ing), the source transmitter coexists with n−1 other transmitters, consisting
of a network of n users, sharing a bandwidth of W . In this framework, the
user accesses the entire bandwidth by outputting samples at the rate of W
before the RF frontend and transmits at all time with full queue. In contrast,
currently typical channelization schemes discussed in Section 6.5.1 have an
average application-layer goodput rate of W
n
at best, which requires correct
and orthogonal channelization at MAC-layer and above. The single-channel
setting (where the entire bandwidth is accessed) also models the worst-case
collision-behavior among multiple coexisting transmitters.
I use the effective signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) for the per-
formance metric, since the greater the effective SINR at the receiver the
better the reliability and rate performance. For instance, Shannon-Hartley
theorem provides the theoretical upper bound on communication rate per-
formance (R) in information theory: R = W log [1 + SINR]. The effective
SINR metric both enables us to abstract away from the particulars of the
physical layer design such as the modulation and coding scheme and reduces
the problem by a degree of freedom, since I no longer need to consider how
many transmitters are coexisting but rather what their collective impact on
the receiver is (e.g., the transmitted power on the channel); for example, one
interfer with five times the power budget has the same impact on the receiver
as five interfers that have identical channel with equal power budget.
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6.3 Attack Model
I aim for security by design and consider a strong attacker model where the
attacker knows not only the transmitter chain strategy but also the physical
frequency and time location of the source transmitter’s medium access (that
is, all of the attacker’s emitted power impacts the transmission as interfer-
ence). In specific, I distinguish three-level of jamming attackers by their
capabilities and information advantage that they have on the victim com-
munication system (while assuming that the adversary has the capability to
maximally use the information advantage for their jamming strategies). The
strongest is the correlated jammer who not only knows the victim transmit-
ter’s physical-layer processing chain information but also the data input that
has been relayed from the upper layers (or equivalently, correlated jammer is
a processing-powerful reactive jammer with negligible reaction time). If an
attacker does not know the data input but only the transmitter’s physical-
layer strategy, then it becomes a coded jammer. Lastly, an attacker who
does not have any information injects interference signal that is independent
to the victim transmission signal, in which case Gaussian signaling has the
most detrimental effect on the victim transmission [22, 23], and thus the at-
tacker is a Gaussian jammer. I establish the attacker model in this section,
analyze and compare the jamming effect of the three jamming strategies
in Section 6.4. Afterward, I introduce RONS that effectively counters the
strongest attack of correlated jamming.
6.3.1 Active Attack on Availability
To model the worst-case scenario for interference, I model the interferer to
be a malicious jammer, an interferer whose sole goal is to degrade the per-
formance of the source transmitter. The optimal jammer strategy, or the
interference signal that results in the minimum capacity rate performance, is
linearly correlated with the target source signal if the jammer has a power
budget comparable to that of the target source transmitter [22,23,38]. Based
on these studies in information theory, I consider such correlated jamming
attack. A correlated jammer cancels the source signal by injecting the same
signal but only inverted (it cancels the signal by causing destructive inter-
ference, in contrast to the more conventional use of jamming to add noise).
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If successful, the received signal becomes uncorrelated with the transmitted
signal (and the received signal does not contain any information about the
transmitted signal) and the capacity becomes zero. Correlated jamming has
also recently been studied in a system-oriented work [39].
A power-constrained attacker needs to only match the transmission power
in order to force zero information transfer at the receiver. In fact, inverted
transmission that exceeds beyond cancellation leaks information to the victim
receiver and may also be helpful in detecting the attacker, as I study in
Section 6.4.1. Therefore, a power-efficient correlated jammer only matches
the transmission power.
Correlated jamming is the most dangerous when frequency, phase, and am-
plitudes are matched with the victim’s transmit signal. Natural frequency
and phase drift and jitter can be matched by the use of aggressive locking
mechanism such as by using phase-locked loop; this attacker model chal-
lenges the notion of (natural) indelible marks on transmissions using sinu-
soidal signals [25]. Such strong attacker needs to precisely know about the
transmission and be able to quickly react. A weaker attack is coded jam-
ming where an attacker only knows about the physical-layer transmission
strategy (such as the redundancy profiles) and do not actively listen to the
transmission. Nevertheless, a coded jammer is not independent to the trans-
mission but is independent to the data input, whereas a correlated jammer
is dependent on both the data input and the transmission chain (and thus
correlated to the output transmission signal). A coded jammer, which has a
much less stringent requirement than a correlated jammer, is much stronger
than simple Gaussian jamming in real-world communication practices due
to adding redundancy and the corresponding receiver strategy to use the re-
dundancy to decode the symbol (as is explained in Chapter 5). Section 6.4
studies interference and compares between correlated, coded, and Gaussian
jamming.
6.3.2 Passive Attack on Confidentiality
Since they know the victim transmitter’s physical-layer strategy, both corre-
lated jammer and coded jammer can correctly decode the message and breach
privacy. The Gaussian jammer, on the other hand, does not know the pro-
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cessing chain and cannot decode the message. RONS effectively preserves
privacy against the advantageous attackers, as I study in Section 6.6.1.
6.4 Jamming Interference Analysis
For interference analysis, I perform Monte-Carlo simulations using MAT-
LAB. While assuming the system model in Section 6.2 and the attack model
in Section 6.3, I use binary phase shift keying (BPSK) modulation and a
root raised cosine filter (RRCF) with a filter order of 256. The natural SNR
(without interference) is 10 dB.
6.4.1 The Usefulness of Information Advantage for Attackers
In Figure 6.1(a), I compare the three jamming strategies of correlated, coded,
and Gaussian against wireless availability and observe that knowing the vic-
tim transmitter strategy gives the jammer advantage and capability to inflict
more damage on the network. While varying the attacker power budget with
respect to that of the legitimate user and assuming perfect synchronization
in phase and frequency, correlated jamming that cancels the signal power
has the biggest impact on wireless availability by yielding the highest error
rate for the legitimate system; coded jamming also has a more detrimental
effect than Gaussian jamming. When the attacker power is matched to the
legitimate transmitter’s power, correlated jamming results in an error rate
of 0.5 (i.e., no information due to complete cancellation of the transmitted
signal) while coded jamming results in an error rate of 0.25 (since coded jam-
ming sends random symbols imitating the physical-layer chain of the source
transmitter and since the source transmitter uses BPSK with alphabet size
of two, there is 0.5 chance of coded jammer sending conflicting symbols and,
when that happens, there is a conditional probability of 0.5 for the event
that the receiver tunes into and decodes the symbol that coded jammer sent;
thus, 0.5 · 0.5 = 0.25). On the other hand, the legitimate user performs
very well against transmission-independent Gaussian jamming since I incor-
porate redundancy at the physical-layer and the receiver uses soft-decoding
to use the information of multiple samples to decode a symbol (as described
in Section 5.3) and thus effectively mitigates transmission-independent noise;
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coded and correlated jamming, on the other hand, knows the MMSE-based
receiver strategy and customizes its signal injection accordingly. Bakr and
Mudumbai [40] also suggests that Gaussian jamming is less effective than
the transmission-customized jamming (their white-hat approach uses jam-
ming for defense against an eavesdropping attacker).
As the interference power grows, the error rate for correlated jamming con-
verges to one and that for coded jamming converges to 0.5 because jamming
transmission dominates the channel and the receiver tunes to the jamming
symbol (for correlated jamming, the inverted symbol is the other symbol
of BPSK and for coded jamming, the random symbol dominates the trans-
mitted symbol). While an error rate of 0.5 effectively reduces into a coin
flip and corresponds to no-information, an error rate exceeding 0.5 actually
yields information to the legitimate user since the correlated jammer sends
an (inversely) correlated symbol to the transmission. If a correlated jammer
is concerned about yielding any information (e.g., legitimate user uses high
error rate for correlated jammer detection), then the correlated jammer can
adjust its transmission power to match that of the legitimate user.
6.4.2 The Effect of Frequency Offset on Correlated Jamming
I study the case when the jamming signal and the victim transmission signal
is not synchronized. While I vary the power amplitude in Section 6.4.1, I
now vary the frequency offset between the two signals, as hardware oscillators
naturally operate at different frequencies and have unique frequency drift and
jitter. Figure 6.1(b) displays the result while the jamming power amplitude
is matched to that of the legitimate transmitter (transmission-independent
Gaussian jamming has a constant SINR of 0.909 and is not plotted). When
perfectly frequency-synchronized, correlated jamming yields zero SINR since
it completely cancels the legitimate source signal; correlated jamming yields
some information about the source transmission and the effective SINR is
0.25. Within 0.5 kHz offset, the jamming effect gets substantially decreases
and eventually settle at an effective SINR of 0.8, which performance is still
better than Gaussian jamming in the attacker’s malicious perspective. As
the frequency offset grows, correlated jamming converges to coded jamming
because the transmission signal does not effectively get cancelled. To accom-
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modate the difference in operating frequencies between hardware oscillators,
IEEE 802.11 allows a center frequency error of ±20 ppm [41]. When operat-
ing in GHz-band, such frequency offsets are enough for correlated and coded
jamming to reach the steady-state effective SINR of 0.8; for instance, IEEE
802.11a channel 165 at carrier frequency 5.825 GHz tolerates frequency offset
of 233 kHz around the center frequency. Although all oscillators operate at
their own unique frequencies and it is natural to have frequency offsets, an
attacker can use a frequency locking scheme with an aggressive use of phase-
locked loops to synchronize frequency and perform the likes of correlated
jamming for signal cancellation.
6.5 Redundancy Offset Narrow Spectrum (RONS)
6.5.1 Motivation and Comparison with Spreading Spectrum
To embrace the coexistence of simultaneously transmitting wireless systems,
communication researchers perform channelization and divide the medium
into multiple channels. The channels are designed to be orthogonal to each
other, so that the transmissions using different channels do not result in
collision and interfere with each other. Typically, the community ensures
orthogonality of channels by interleaving their access by time, frequency,
and code (processing).
Unfortunately, the current approaches that implement orthogonal chan-
nelization negatively affect the individual user’s data rate performance. By
sharing the medium with other users (with equal priority) via orthogonal
channelization, the expected individual user’s rate performance is inversely
proportional to the number of coexisting users, in the best-case scenario,
while the overall network performance (the sum aggregation of individual
user performances) remains the same. This is because frequency or time-
based channelization divides the respective resources by the number of users
or more, while all the medium resources could have been used by the source
transmitter if other transmitters were not present.
On the other hand, code-based channelization introduces additional re-
dundancy and consumes more medium resources than it would have needed
if there were no channel division. For instance, a typical realization of code
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division multiple access (CDMA) involves a redundancy block called direct
sequence spread spectrum (DSSS); DSSS temporally spreads the symbol by
mapping a sample into multiple chips, and the number of chips per symbol
is called processing gain or spreading gain (which is the redundancy rate
of the DSSS redundancy block). If the system retains the sampling rate
within the block, then it consumes the amount of time that is larger than if
there were no DSSS block to transmit the same amount of information (the
time increase is proportional to the processing gain). Alternatively, DSSS
increases the sampling rate (so that the chip rate is greater than the input
symbol rate by the processing gain), which consumes a proportionally larger
bandwidth. DSSS increases the SNR by the processing gain and effectively
mitigates physical interference by first, carefully choosing the set of DSSS
profiles (chip sequences that map the symbol to chips) so that they are or-
thogonal to each other, and second, the receiver combining the information of
multiple chips to decode the corresponding sample. By sharing the random
spreading code only among the participating parties, DSSS can be helpful
in both availability (interference, like noise, gets mitigated) confidentiality
(correct code is necessary to decode the message). In contrast to the spread-
ing spectrum technology which entitles the spreading cost in rate, RONS
minimizes intra-channel interference by emulating orthogonal access without
the drawback in rate performance.
6.5.2 Redundancy Offset Narrow Spectrum Scheme
The goal of RONS is to mitigate interference without the spreading cost in
data rate. RONS is similar to DSSS in that it is processing based, but it uses
the redundancy blocks that are already in place of the transmitter chain, as
opposed to introducing a new set of redundancy as DSSS does. Given the
profile of a pre-existing redundancy block, RONS creates multiple profiles
by adding cyclic phase offsets (or cyclic delay), which I denote with φ.1
With the offset values chosen so that the generated redundancy profiles have
zero correlation with one another (so that they are statistically orthogonal
to each other), the use of a profile for signal processing yields statistically
1If the redundancy profile of the block that RONS is deployed is odd and periodic, then
φ = pi is equivalent to the signal that a correlated jammer will transmit once the victim
transmission is present.
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independent channel path from using any other profiles. I call the set of
profiles generated using such phase offsets RONS channels. In other words,
the cross correlation between any two signals using distinct RONS channels
is very small.
Deciding on RONS channels depends on the processing operation of the
redundancy block. The phase offset selection for RONS channel generation
is straightforward when the redundancy block only performs upconversion
and element-by-element mapping, in which case, I can observe the correla-
tion between the generated redundancy profiles after adding the cyclic phase
offsets. One common use of RONS is the quadrature modulation, described
in Section 5.2, where one channel (the I channel) uses sine profile and the
other channel (the Q channel) uses sine with φ = pi/2. However, in contrast
to quadrature modulation and DSSS, for redundancy blocks that do not
merely perform element-by-element mapping, such as the DAC filter (which
involves convolution), the RONS phase offset selection not only depends on
the redundancy profiles but also with the input of the redundancy block.
After deciding on the set of pair-wise mutually uncorrelated RONS chan-
nels, the transmitter-receiver pair choose a random RONS channel (which
can be derived from the secret key), so that a correlated jammer (and an
eavesdropper) cannot target the correct RONS channel to compromise the
signal. For reactive jammers who sense the channel, I incorporate random-
ization by channel hopping across RONS channels. Since the RONS phase
offsets can be added per symbol basis, this requires that the attacker cannot
respond within a symbol.
After sharing the initial key, RONS uses the data transmission content to
update the key; specifically, it uses a hash function of a packet consisted of
multiple symbols (and thus spread across multiple RONS channels). As the
packet size (in symbols) increases, the probability of attacker guessing the
correct hopping sequence and extracting the data decreases exponentially (in
Section 6.6.1, where I study RONS effectiveness in confidentiality, I see that
tuning in another RONS channel leads to incorrect decoding).
I also introduce a design parameter τ that controls the tradeoff between the
statistical orthogonality between RONS channels and the number of RONS
channels that the system can afford, since more RONS channels will make
the channel-guessing attacker more difficult to make a correct guess. In other
words, I allow that the inter-RONS-channel correlation to be as great as τ
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in selecting RONS channels.
Furthermore, RONS uses natural binary code when it maps from bits to
symbols rather than the more popular Gray code; in natural binary code, the
number index of the bits proportionally increases with phase. By having the
adjacent symbols only differ by a bit when mapping the bits into symbols,
Gray code is also popularly used along with error correction since, if symbol
error occurred, it is more likely that the random noise yields closeby symbols
than symbols that are further away on the constellation diagram. However,
correlated jamming injects inverted signal with a phase offset of pi (on the
opposite side of the constellation diagram) and not random noise, and thus, it
is more likely that the decoded symbol is further away from the transmitted
symbol, especially when correlated jammer transmits with higher power than
the legitimate transmission. When the attacker power dominates, the cod-
ing scheme does not affect the symbol error rate (there will almost always
be errors because the receiver tunes on the attacker signal) but it affects
the bit error rate, and RONS uses natural binary coding to lower the bit
error rate after the symbol-to-bit mapping on the receiver. Figure 6.2 dis-
plays the bit error rate varying the coding alphabet size while assuming a
modulation scheme that, for every symbol representing a message, there is
another symbol representing distinct message with a phase offset of pi; the
correlated jammer dominates and the receiver decodes the inverted symbol.
With RONS using natural binary code, the bit error rate becomes inversely
proportional to the log2 of the alphabet size, or the number of bits that gets
mapped to the symbol.
6.6 RONS Evaluation
For RONS evaluation, I perform Monte-Carlo simulation using MATLAB.
For consistency, I use the same parameters as I did in Section 6.4. Namely, I
use binary phase shift keying (BPSK) modulation and a root raised cosine fil-
ter (RRCF) with a filter order of 256; the natural SNR (without interference)
is 10 dB.
I apply RONS on the RRCF pulse-shaping filter, as was mentioned in
Section 5.2. RRCF filter is suitable for RONS because it is a digital filter
operating in discrete-time domain (easier to implement, stable, and has a
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Figure 6.2: Bit error rate with the bit-to-symbol alphabet size when
correlated jammer dominates
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Figure 6.3: RONS channels and correct decoding
linear phase characteristic) and is robust to fading (and thus agrees with
the channel model). I use correlation threshold τ of 0.01 and the number of
RONS channels is 8. Random RONS channel hopping is simulated, and the
correlated jammer guesses a RONS channel.
6.6.1 RONS for Confidentiality
By incorporating randomization in the phase offsets (the RONS channels),
RONS can be helpful for protecting confidentiality. Figure 6.3 shows com-
munication reliability while varying the phase offsets between a transmitter
and a (potentially malicious) receiver. Without knowing the correct phase
offset, the receiver does not have capability of decoding the transmission,
as the error rate quickly approaches 0.5, which yields no information about
the transmission. Therefore, if the source transmitter can keep the RONS
channel random and secret, then the receivers failing to tune into the correct
RONS channel fails to decode the transmitted data correctly.
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6.6.2 RONS for Availability
I study RONS performance against correlated jamming. In Figure 6.4(a), I
study the effective SINR while varying the signal-to-interference ratio (SIR)
(where the interference model is the worst-case of corrrelated jamming).
Without RONS, the effective SINR becomes zero when interference power
is greater than the signal power meaning that the received signal has zero in-
formation about the transmitted signal, since it effectively got cancelled. Un-
surprisingly, the performance monotonically increases as the SIR increases.
Enabling RONS prevents the transmitted signal from getting completely can-
celled and outperforms the case when RONS is disabled. Figure 6.4(b) plots
the effective SINR gain of enabling RONS compared to that when RONS is
disabled and the jamming attacker knows the transmission and is synchro-
nized (for example, gain of 100% indicates that the performance of enabling
RONS is twice as good as that of disabling RONS). With the gain being
∞ when SIR < 0 dB (since the reference case of disabling RONS yields
zero performance), the gain decreases as SIR increases. Even though RONS
performance eventually converges to the correlated jamming performance
both when SIR grows (as the remaining signal after cancellation is still big)
and when SIR shrinks (as interference power simply overwhelms the signal
power), RONS performance against correlated jamming is the most effective
when they have comparable amount of power, i.e., SIR is close to 0 dB, and
thus when correlated jamming has the most detrimental impact on the victim
without a countermeasure (as shown in Section 6.4.1).
6.7 Chapter Summary
RONS provides a novel rate-efficient scheme to incorporate randomization for
wireless security. Against a very strong attack of frequency-synchronized cor-
related jamming, it provides throughput even when the correlated jammer’s
power budget exceeds that of the source transmitter (with no countermea-
sure, the correlated jammer forces zero capacity). RONS is the most effective
when correlated jamming is the most effective (without a countermeasure
deployed) with its transmitter power comparable to that of the source trans-
mitter; when the jammer power budget exceeds -2 dB of that of the source
transmitter, the effective gain is greater than 70%.
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Figure 6.4: RONS’ performance for jamming mitigation
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CHAPTER 7
DISSERTATION SUMMARY
MAC-layer protocols, used for efficiently supporting multiple coexisting trans-
missions given a shared channel resource, are vulnerable to node failure or
misbehaving. In particular, I investigate the vulnerability of reservation-
based MAC protocols where users first send control messages to reserve
channels and then transmit data on those reserved channels (for example,
in IEEE 802.11 four-way handshaking protocol for virtual carrier sensing,
the pair of request-to-send (RTS) and clear-to-send (CTS) are control mes-
sages that notify the channel reservations to other simultaneously existing
transmitters). When the network is compromised and a misbehaving user has
as much capability as the protocol-complying users, I consider three threats
on such MAC protocols to model failure: jamming on known control channel
(disrupting the control communication and disabling channel reservation),
using control message to facilitate power-efficient jamming on data channel
(only targeting the channels that are occupied by legitimate transmissions,
as opposed to wasting power on empty channels), and injecting bogus control
messages (reserving channels without using it and thus wasting resources).
The colluding attackers also compromise the network and have the same
access as any other legitimate member.
To counter the first two attacks of control-channel jamming and control-
aware data jamming, SimpleMAC relies on jamming-resistant unicast trans-
mission and then uses a control communication mechanism that multicasts
(as opposed to broadcasting) and shares the control messages containing the
reservation information to subset of users. In other words, SimpleMAC di-
verges from the traditional binary approach of sharing the control message
with either everybody or nobody and adjusts the strategy according to the
user behaviors (and the performance outcomes); it minimizes interference
from both protocol-abiding benign users and misbehaving attackers.
For the threat on MAC protocols that involves sending bogus control mes-
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sages, IFR-MAC holds the users accountable by checking their use of reserved
channels via feedback and adapting the channel allocation accordingly. In
other words, assuming a flexible channelization scheme with varying carrier
frequency and flexible bandwidth access, IFR-MAC assigns channel resource
according to the users’ truthfulness in reservations. I also study the dis-
tributed case where all users agree on a channelization scheme, in which case,
the channel fluctuation (e.g., fading) negatively impacts the performance of
the protocol.
When MAC fails to support orthogonal channel access between network
users or in a single-channel scenario when the network medium is not di-
vided into multiple orthogonal channels (and thus, the attacker knows the
exact location of the victim user’s accessed channel), RONS counters the
information-theoretically optimal correlated jamming and further helps en-
suring confidentiality. It operates on built-in redundancy blocks (and thus,
does not incur additional cost in rate performance) and adds cyclic phase
shifts to emulate randomization on channel access and spreading spectrum.
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